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NOTES
RECONCILING RIPLEY AND JOYE: A FACTSENSITIVE ANALYSIS OF PETITION-YEAR AND
PRE-PETITION-YEAR INCOME TAX CLAIMS IN
CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCIES
Janicelynn J. Asamoto*
Parties to a chapter 13 bankruptcy often contest the status and
dischargeability of income tax claims, especially when proofs of claim for
these taxes are filed late. Prepetition claims that are filed late may be
discharged once the debtor successfully completes a chapter 13 repayment
plan. Taxing authorities, however, often allege that these liabilities
represent nondischargeable postpetition claims that have “become
payable” after the bankruptcy petition was filed. Courts have resolved this
issue in conflicting ways: while some have found that taxes “become
payable” at the end of the taxable year, most have ruled that the tax
return’s due date was decisive.
This Note observes, however, that this conflict appears rooted in a
difference of fact. Courts favoring a tax-return rule have been addressing
tax claims in the year the bankruptcy was filed. By contrast, courts that
apply a taxable-year rule have been discussing tax claims for the year
immediately preceding the bankruptcy filing. Finding this distinction
significant, this Note presents an outline for analyzing income tax liability
in chapter 13 cases and concludes that both the type of tax claim faced by
each court and the petition-filing timeline are as significant to the courts’
analyses as their respective interpretations of the phrase “become
payable.” Applying this framework, this Note illustrates that the taxableyear rule better establishes the critical date upon which taxes should
“become payable” to a taxing authority.
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INTRODUCTION
When Shelli and Teresa Joye filed for bankruptcy under chapter 13 of the
Bankruptcy Code (Code), they notified their creditors—including the
California Franchise Tax Board—of the bar date for prepetition claims.
Rather than file a timely prepetition claim, the tax agency relied on a certain
Code provision to file a postpetition claim after the bar date had expired.
But after deciding that the claim was more accurately described as a
prepetition claim filed late, the court discharged the debt. The silver lining
in Shelli and Teresa’s bankruptcy case, then, was successfully sidestepping
payment of over $28,000 in back taxes.1
With few exceptions, the Code focuses on debts incurred before a debtor
filed his bankruptcy petition.2 A chapter 13 repayment plan contemplates

1. Joye v. Franchise Tax Bd. (In re Joye), 578 F.3d 1070, 1073, 1079 (9th Cir. 2009).
See infra Part II.B for a detailed analysis of this case and infra Part I.D.3.b for a discussion
of the provision referred to in the text, 11 U.S.C. § 1305 (2006).
2. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 503 (allowing administrative expenses incurred after petitionfiling date); id. § 1305 (describing procedure for filing and allowing certain postpetition
claims); id. §§ 501(d), 502(b)(5), (e)–(i) (disallowing both postpetition interest not yet due
and payable, and claims for postpetition alimony, maintenance, and support); see also 3
WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON III, NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND
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full or partial compensation of these prepetition claims.3 Only in limited
situations, described in Code § 1305, may a creditor submit proofs of
postpetition claims.4 In part, these postpetition claims “may be filed by any
entity that holds a claim against the debtor . . . for taxes that become
payable to a governmental unit while the case is pending.”5 In the situation
described above, the court’s ruling turned on an interpretation of when taxes
“become payable” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 1305.6 Courts have
grappled with the precise meaning of the phrase “become payable” because
the interpretation of these two words carries more than mere lexicological
significance. As the Joyes’ situation exemplifies, thousands of dollars in
tax liability, and even an individual’s solvency after having filed for chapter
13, can turn on how a court interprets these two words.
One reading of the statute finds that tax claims “become payable” when
they absolutely must be paid. Courts adhering to this tax-return rule use a
tax return’s due date (April 15, absent extensions) to distinguish those
claims that have “become payable” from those that have not.7 The contrary
reading of the statute concludes that tax claims “become payable” when
they are capable of being paid, even if they have not been assessed or come
due. The courts that apply a taxable-year rule find that taxes are capable of
being paid at the end of the taxable year and thus have “become payable” at
that time.8
Various sources, including the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, characterize these competing interpretations of the Code as a circuit
split.9 A circuit split would certainly complicate bankruptcy proceedings at
a time when bankruptcies steadily continue to rise.10 Indeed, petitions to
PRACTICE § 48:33 n.1 (3d ed. 2008) (describing how Code provisions interact to preclude
filing claims for aforementioned postpetition alimony, maintenance, and support).
3. A reorganization plan must contemplate full repayment of priority prepetition
claims; the extent to which other prepetition claims are repaid depends on the debtor’s
disposable income, his debts, and how he classifies the claims in the reorganization plan. See
11 U.S.C. § 1322.
4. Id. § 1305(a).
5. Id. § 1305(a)(1).
6. In re Joye, 578 F.3d at 1079. See infra Part II.B for a detailed analysis of this case.
7. This Note uses the term “tax-return rule” to describe this rule promulgated by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. See United States v. Ripley (In re Ripley), 926
F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1991).
8. This Note uses the term “taxable-year rule” when describing the analysis advanced
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See In re Joye, 578 F.3d 1070.
9. Id. at 1077 n.3; id. at 1082–83 (Graber, J., dissenting); In re Senczyszyn, 426 B.R.
250, 255 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2010); Taxes “Payable” Under § 1305 When Capable of Being
Paid, WEST’S BANKR. NEWSL. (Thomson Reuters/West Eagan, MN), Sept. 9, 2009, at 2; 9th
Circuit Rules That Tax Assessed on a Post Chapter 13 Filed Tax Return for a Prepetition
Year is a Prepetition Debt, BANKRUPTCYPROF BLOG (Aug. 23, 2009),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/bankruptcyprof_blog/9th_circuit_briefs/.
10. Press Release, Am. Bankr. Inst., Total U.S. Bankruptcies in First Half of 2010 Up 14
Percent
over
First
Half
of
2009
(Aug.
17,
2010),
available
at
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/PrinterTemplate.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/Con
tentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=61613 [hereinafter ABI Press Release].
Consumer
bankruptcies increased by fifteen percent; chapter 13 filings saw a nine percent increase. Id.
While these increases are significant, they pale in comparison to the increase in filings seen
between the first six months of 2008 and 2009. See Press Release, Am. Bankr. Inst., Total
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file chapter 13 individual debt repayment plans are approaching pre-2005
levels.11
A more plausible explanation, however, is that a significant fact
distinguishes the cases that led to these divergent rules, making a direct
comparison problematic. A close look at these cases reveals that one court
addressed a petition-year tax claim12 while the other court was concerned
with pre-petition-year tax liability.13 Although the two readings of
“become payable” play a role in the subsequent analysis, the type of tax
claim before the court must be the initial focus. This Note underscores the
importance of properly classifying contested income tax claims, a subject
given only a cursory review by courts,14 as it proposes a cogent framework
for analyzing the proper status of these tax claims in a chapter 13 case.
In Part I, this Note provides an overview of the relevant bankruptcy
concepts by describing the chapter 13 process generally and the Code’s
different treatment of prepetition and postpetition claims. Part II presents
the analyses of the circuit courts that have addressed the status of income
tax liability in a chapter 13 case. In United States v. Ripley (In re Ripley),15
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit discussed a debtor’s tax
liability in the petition-year and applied a tax-return rule to conclude that
the contested tax liability was a postpetition claim. By contrast, the Ninth
Circuit in Joye v. Franchise Tax Board (In re Joye)16 applied a taxable-year
rule when it concluded that a petition-year income tax claim was incurred
prepetition.
Part III observes that, because the two cases are factually distinct, both
the type of tax claim faced by each court and the petition-filing timeline are
as significant to the courts’ conclusions as their respective interpretations of
U.S. Bankruptcies in First Half of 2009 Up 36 Percent over First Half of 2008; Chapter 11
Business Filings Increase 113 Percent (Aug. 13, 2009), available at
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDi
splay.cfm&CONTENTID=58407.
11. See Personal Bankruptcy Filings by Quarter: 1992 (1st Quarter)–2009 (1st
Quarter),
AM.
BANKR.
INST.
(2009),
http://www.abiworld.org/statcharts/
Quarterlypersonalfilingsthrough1Q09.pdf; Non-business U.S. Bankruptcy Filings by
Quarter, CALCULATEDRISK: FINANCE AND ECONOMICS (Nov. 4, 2009, 11:21:00 AM ),
http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_pMscxxELHEg/
SvGrknvU0fI/AAAAAAAAGuM/jQeNrFCu9F0/s1600-h/ABIOctober2009.jpg. Filings for
all consumer bankruptcies increased in anticipation of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA or 2005 Amendments), which substantially changed
such bankruptcies. See Influence of Total Consumer Debt on Bankruptcy Filings: Trends by
Year 1980–2008, AM. BANKR. INST. (2009), http://www.abiworld.org/statcharts/
ConsumerDebt-Bankruptcy2008FINAL.pdf.
12. This Note refers to income tax owed in the year a debtor filed his chapter 13
bankruptcy petition as “petition-year” tax liability.
13. As used in this Note, “pre-petition-year” tax liability is income tax incurred in the
year that immediately precedes the petition-year. This terminology should not be mistaken
for claims described as “prepetition,” a broader bankruptcy term that encompasses all claims
incurred before the debtor filed his bankruptcy petition.
14. See Dixon v. IRS (In re Dixon), 218 B.R. 150, 151–52 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1998).
Neither In re Ripley nor In re Joye addresses this issue with any great detail.
15. 926 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1991).
16. 578 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2009).
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the phrase “become payable.” Using hypotheticals that illustrate the
different claims at issue, Part III presents an analytical framework for
determining the status of both petition-year and pre-petition-year income
tax liability in chapter 13 cases. Applying that framework, this Note
concludes that the taxable-year rule better establishes the critical date upon
which taxes “become payable” to a governmental unit.
I. CHAPTER 13: PREPETITION AND POSTPETITION CLAIMS
Properly determining the status of income tax claims has significant
ramifications for the individual debtor, the tax agency-creditor, and the
advancement of the policy goals served by chapter 13 reorganizations. Part
I.A provides a brief overview of the chapter 13 bankruptcy process. Part
I.B describes the objectives of the Bankruptcy Code, emphasizing the
policies implicated in chapter 13 when the creditor is a taxing authority. In
particular, various Code provisions demonstrate congressional deference to
federal and state taxing authorities, the involuntary creditors in a
bankruptcy case.17 However, a taxing authority’s tardy engagement in
bankruptcy cases often conflicts with a debtor’s interest in securing speedy
approval of their reorganization plans and proper compensation or
discharge of their creditors’ claims. Part I.C then describes how the Code
views the chapter 13 bankruptcy estate.
When courts adjudicate the outcome of income tax claims, they
essentially seek to determine whether the claim arose before the debtor filed
for chapter 13 or, as noted in § 1305, “while the case is pending.”18 Part
I.D distinguishes prepetition and postpetition claims by reviewing the
relevant Code provisions and associated Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure. This synopsis defines what constitutes a claim; how claims are
prioritized, filed, accepted, barred, and discharged; and the ways in which
treatment of a claim differs based on whether it arose before or after the
chapter 13 petition was filed.
A. The Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Process
Most consumer-debtors face four options when filing for bankruptcy,
only one of which concerns this Note.19 The chapter 13 reorganization
process is a recent addition in the long evolution of bankruptcy law.20 In
17. See infra Part I.B.
18. 11 U.S.C. § 1305 (2006).
19. For an overview of the other forms of bankruptcy protection available for individual
debtors, see generally MARJORIE GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY OPTIONS FOR THE CONSUMER DEBTOR
(1981) (chapter 7 bankruptcies); CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 957–84
(1997) (chapter 12 bankruptcies); ELIZABETH WARREN, BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY (1993)
(chapter 11 bankruptcies); ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF
DEBTORS AND CREDITORS: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 113–271 (6th ed. 2009) (chapter 7
and chapter 11 bankruptcies); Katherine M. Porter, Phantom Farmers: Chapter 12 of the
Bankruptcy Code, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 729 (2005) (chapter 12 bankruptcies).
20. See, e.g., W.J. JONES, THE FOUNDATIONS OF ENGLISH BANKRUPTCY: STATUTES AND
COMMISSIONS IN THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1979); V. MARKHAM LESTER, VICTORIAN
INSOLVENCY: BANKRUPTCY, IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND COMPANY WINDING-UP IN
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the early twentieth century, when bankruptcy reorganization was available
only to merchants and companies, a man named Valentine Nesbitt
improvised a “wage-earner plan” for working individuals.21 He believed
that unscrupulous creditors shared responsibility for a debtor’s financial
situation and that debtors with a steady income often preferred to repay
their debts, but simply required more time to do so.22 These principles have
survived the evolution of our present bankruptcy legislation.
The decision to file for bankruptcy under chapter 13 lies with the debtor
alone;23 creditors cannot force the debtor into a chapter 13 case.24
Furthermore, although only the creditor of a postpetition claim can submit a
proof of claim, the debtor ultimately decides whether a claim is provided
for under a reorganization plan, further delegating pivotal decisions to the
debtor.25 The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
(BAPCPA), also known as the 2005 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code
(2005 Amendments), may have removed some of chapter 13’s filing
incentives,26 but the Code’s continued emphasis on the debtor’s
engagement in the process remains noteworthy.
An individual whose secured and unsecured debts do not exceed certain
statutory thresholds may elect to repay creditors over time by proposing a
debt repayment plan under chapter 13 of the Code.27 A debt repayment
plan commits all of the debtor’s “disposable income” (as determined by a
codified formula) to a bankruptcy trustee for a period of three to five

NINETEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND (1995); DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A
HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA (2001) (examining the history and evolution of
bankruptcy reform in the United States).
21. Timothy W. Dixon & David G. Epstein, Where Did Chapter 13 Come from and
Where Should It Go?, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 741, 749–50 (2002).
22. Id. at 749.
23. However, since Congress adopted the “means test” in BAPCPA, certain debtors that
do not qualify may be precluded from filing under chapter 7. In those cases, the case would
either be dismissed or converted, with the debtor’s permission, to a chapter 11 or chapter 13
reorganization. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2006).
24. CHARLES J. TABB & RALPH BRUBAKER, BANKRUPTCY LAW: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES,
AND PRACTICE 73 (2d ed. 2006); see also 11 U.S.C. § 303(a).
25. See 1 HENRY J. SOMMER, CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY LAW & PRACTICE 131 (9th ed.
2009).
26. See, e.g., id. at 4, 307 (listing changes in the 2005 Amendments that made filing
under chapter 13 a less attractive option for debtors while noting that, its “Orwellian title”
notwithstanding, the 2005 Amendments are “clearly not a ‘Consumer Protection Act’”); Jack
F. Williams & Jacob L. Todres, Tax Consequences of Post-Petition Income as Property of
the Estate in an Individual Debtor Chapter 11 Case and Tax Disclosure in Chapter 11, 13
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 701, 701 (2005) (declaring governmental taxing authorities the
“major winners” in the 2005 Act).
27. See 1 SOMMER, supra note 25, at 287–88. Effective April 1, 2010, eligibility
requirements for chapter 13 filers limit a debtor to no more than $360,475 in unsecured
liquidated debt and $1,081,400 in secured liquidated debt. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (2010); U.S.
BANKR. COURT E.D. VA., AUTOMATIC ADJUSTMENT OF CERTAIN DOLLAR AMOUNTS IN THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE AND OFFICIAL BANKRUPTCY FORMS (2010), available at
www.vaeb.uscourts.gov/FILES/20100401_adj.pdf.
The eligibility requirements are
readjusted for inflation every three years. See 11 U.S.C. § 104(b) (2006); 1 SOMMER, supra
note 25, at 308.
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years.28 Those funds are then distributed to repay creditors’ claims
“provided for” in the plan.29
Although over the course of the repayment period, secured claims must
be fully repaid,30 if the estate is unable to fully compensate a debtor’s
unsecured liabilities, courts allow the pro rata compensation of these
claims.31 As a limiting rule, however, individual debtors must propose to
repay unsecured creditors at least as much as they would have received if
the debtor’s assets had been liquidated.32 These rules apply to the
repayment of priority unsecured income tax claims as well.33
The trustee decides if the plan is feasible given the debtor’s ability to
pay34 and whether it is confirmable.35 The court sets a meeting of the
creditors and a bar date by which creditors must present proofs of claims.36
The claims are generally allowed, unless a party in interest objects.37
Although this process is rather rigid, the Code provides bankruptcy filers
with the flexibility to design the plan, including the distribution of claims,
as they see fit. These plans are endorsed by the bankruptcy trustee prior to
court approval of the plan at a confirmation hearing.38
Once confirmed, a chapter 13 plan is res judicata over all claims for
which the plan provides, thereby binding all debtors and creditors to its
provisions.39 For the duration of the plan, the debtor hands over his
disposable income to the trustee, who compensates creditors’ claims with
28. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2), (b)(4).
29. Id. §§ 1325(a)(5), 1302(b)(3). Creditors are those who have a claim against a debtor
or his estate that arose before or when the debtor filed a bankruptcy petition. Id. § 101(10).
Claims, as described more fully below, are defined broadly as rights to payment and embrace
even a debtor’s remote or contingent obligations. See id. § 101(5); H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at
309 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6266; infra Part I.D.1.
30. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362–64; Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case
for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and a Reply to Critics,
82 CORNELL L. REV. 1279, 1281 (1997).
31. In re Penn-Mahoning Mining, Inc., 45 B.R. 51, 52 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1984); see also
C. RICHARD MCQUEEN & JACK F. WILLIAMS, TAX ASPECTS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW AND
PRACTICE § 8:16 (3d ed. 1997, updated June 2010).
32. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4); David G. Epstein, What Happens During a Chapter 13
Bankruptcy Case?, in UNDERSTANDING THE BASICS OF BANKRUPTCY & REORGANIZATION
501, 506 (2006) (PLI Comm. L. & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 9087, 2006).
33. See infra Part I.D.2.a.
34. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1325(a)(6), 1302(b), 704(a)(4).
35. Epstein, supra note 32, at 505.
36. 11 U.S.C. § 501. The bar date is the deadline for filing claims. Claims for most
creditors must be filed within ninety days of the first scheduled meeting of the creditors.
The claims of taxing authorities benefit from a more generous deadline. FED. R. BANKR. P.
3002(c); 7 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 2, § 146:8, at 146-32, 146-38 to 146-40; see also
11 U.S.C. § 1322(b).
37. 11 U.S.C. § 502(a). In a chapter 13 proceeding, a “party in interest” refers to the
trustee, the debtor, and the creditors (who may object to the claim of another creditor). See 4
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 502.02[2] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.
rev. 2009); see also Kowal v. Malkemus (In re Thompson), 965 F.2d 1136 (1st Cir. 1992);
In re Grassgreen, 172 B.R. 383 (M.D. Fla. 1994); In re Simon, 179 B.R. 1, 6–7 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1995).
38. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1324, 1322(b).
39. Id. § 1327(a); see also 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 37, ¶ 1327.01.
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deferred payments over time.40 The chapter 13 case can end in three ways:
(1) the case is dismissed for cause or by the debtor’s choice;41 (2) the case
is converted into a chapter 7, 11, or 12 proceeding;42 or (3) the debtor
completes the plan and any remaining debts—including the unsecured
priority tax claims provided for in the plan—are discharged.43
A plan “provides for” a claim if the plan either deals with or refers to a
claim; actual payment or benefit to the creditor is not necessary.44
Effectively, a chapter 13 plan may provide for a claim even if the trustee
does not allocate any of the debtor’s disposable income toward satisfying
that debt. In the income tax context, this can occur if a taxing authority’s
proof of claim was filed after the bar date or otherwise disallowed.45 This
characteristic of chapter 13 plans plays a marked role in the dischargeability
of tax claims in the cases discussed in Part II.46
Chapter 13 can be an attractive alternative to liquidation for a number of
reasons. From a creditor’s perspective, a debt repayment plan could
provide more compensation for unsecured claims than a sale of non-exempt
assets.47 Debtors also benefit, by retaining non-exempt property while
protecting cosigners to their debt.48 Moreover, the “superdischarge”
provision in chapter 13 proceedings is more generous than the chapter 7
discharge.49 Of particular relevance to this Note, priority unsecured income

40. 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)–(b).
41. Id. § 1307.
42. Id.; see also id. §§ 706, 1112, 1208.
43. Id. § 1328; see also id. §§ 523–24.
44. See Lawrence Tractor Co. v. Gregory (In re Gregory), 705 F.2d 1118, 1122
(9th Cir. 1983); MCQUEEN & WILLIAMS, supra note 31, § 10:13.
45. MCQUEEN & WILLIAMS, supra note 31, § 10:13.
46. See infra Parts I.D.2.c, II.
47. William C. Whitford, Has the Time Come To Repeal Chapter 13?, 65 IND. L.J. 85,
102 (1989); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4).
48. Whitford, supra note 47, at 94.
49. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 727, with id. § 1328. The superdischarge is subject to a
debtor’s good-faith attempt to repay creditors to the extent possible. Robert J. Bein,
Subjectivity, Good Faith and the Expanded Chapter 13 Discharge, 70 MO. L. REV. 655, 656
(2005). Certain debts, including obligations arising out of some willful and malicious torts,
settlement debts for marital property, and debts outstanding from a previous bankruptcy
case, are not dischargeable. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a). In addition, changes implemented by the
BAPCPA narrowed the scope of chapter 13’s discharge. See 1 SOMMER, supra note 25, at
307. The chapter 13 superdischarge no longer discharges taxes that should have been
withheld and must be repaid, debts related to a debtor’s fraudulent behavior or willful tax
evasion, and debts incurred just prior to filing for bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (general chapter 13 discharge
provision, which when speaking to nondischargeability of certain debts, incorporates by
reference § 507(a)(8)(C) (trust fund taxes), § 523(a)(1)(B)–(C) (willful tax evasion), and
§ 523(a)(2)–(4) (fradulent behavior and recently incurred debts)). Moreover, an individual
who benefitted from a chapter 13 discharge in the preceding two years or a chapter 7, 11, or
12 discharge in the preceding four years is now precluded from receiving another
superdischarge. Id. § 1328(f).
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tax claims that normally must be fully repaid may be discharged if they
were improperly filed.50
Despite the potential benefits to both debtors and creditors alike, chapter
13 reorganization remains a long and arduous process.51 That may explain
why, in spite of congressional attempts to direct potential bankruptcy filers
to chapter 13,52 individuals who seek to liquidate their assets continue to far
outnumber those who opt to reorganize.53 The next section builds on this
brief overview of chapter 13 by describing some of the general policy
rationales implicated by chapter 13 and the additional considerations
presented when the creditor is a taxing authority.
B. Bankruptcy Policies
In its modern incarnation, the Bankruptcy Code is widely acknowledged
to further two goals: (1) compensate creditors equitably, and (2) provide
filers with a clean financial slate—the debtor’s fresh start.54 Among
creditors, holders of unsecured claims in particular stand to benefit from a
chapter 13 proceeding. A bankruptcy case can increase the collective value
50. See supra text accompanying notes 39–46; see also In re Elstien, 238 B.R. 747, 756
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1999) (“If the plan provides for a debt, but the creditor fails to file a claim,
the underlying debt will not be paid but will be discharged.”); In re Rothman, 76 B.R. 38, 41
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding tax claim dischargeable even if tax agency did not know
the value of the claim before the bar date passed); 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note
37, ¶ 1328.02[2].
51. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d) (describing the duration of a chapter 13 repayment plan as
ranging from three to five years); see also Jean Braucher, Getting Realistic: In Defense of
Formulaic Means Testing, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 395, 397–98 (2009) (noting that the chapter
13 completion rate has historically hovered around thirty-three percent (citing NAT’L BANKR.
REVIEW COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 90 (1997); Scott F. Norberg and
Andrew J. Velkey, Debtor Discharge and Creditor Repayment in Chapter 13, 39 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 473, 476 (2006); William C. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice:
Consumer Bankruptcy As Consumer Protection, and Consumer Protection in Consumer
Bankruptcy, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 397, 410–11 (1994))).
52. Congress, worried in part that some debtors who could repay their creditors might
file under chapter 7 in order to avoid doing so, implemented needs-based reforms, among
others, in hopes of increasing the “rate of repayment to creditors.” See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31,
pt. 1, at 11–12 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 98–99.
53. See ABI Press Release, supra note 10 (demonstrating that during the first six months
of 2010, nearly twenty-seven percent of consumer debtors filed under chapter 13 while
seventy-three percent filed under chapter 7). The number of chapter 13 filers still exceeded
208,000 in the first six months of 2010. Id.; Am. Bankr. Inst., Quarterly Non-Business
Filings By Chapter (1994–2010) (2010), available at http://www.abiworld.org/AM/
AMTemplate.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID
=58410 (last visited Oct. 23, 2010).
54. See, e.g., In re Stewart, 290 B.R. 302, 306 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2003); In re
Robertson, No. 697-61956, 2000 WL 33716977, at *2 (Bankr. D. Or. Jan. 7, 2000); In re
Cason, 190 B.R. 917, 927 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995); 1 SOMMER, supra note 25, at 19; 3
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1101 (Fred
B. Rothman 1991) (1833); TABB & BRUBAKER, supra note 24, at 73; Gregory L. Germain,
Income Tax Claims in the Year of Bankruptcy: A Congressionally Created Quagmire, 59
TAX LAW. 329, 331 (2006). But see Eric A. Posner, Should Debtors Be Forced into Chapter
13?, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 965, 972 (1999) (providing an economic context for bankruptcy
and describing two purposes of relevant law: “minimize the cost of credit” and “provide
insurance against income shocks”).
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of the debtor’s assets while reducing externalities, differences in recoveries,
In its concern for creditors, Congress
and administrative costs.55
differentiates government-agency creditors from ordinary creditors.
Recognizing that taxing authorities serve as involuntary creditors to tens of
millions of individuals,56 the Code includes language that provides greater
leeway to these government organizations.57 This preference is evident in
the later bar date for claims submitted by a governmental unit58 and the
elimination of an administrative requirement that facilitates repayment of
certain tax claims.59 These provisions illustrate the special emphasis that
Congress places on compensating the tax agency-creditor in a chapter 13
case.
Despite the obvious detriment to creditors when courts discharge an
individual’s debts, the fresh-start policy has been entrenched in bankruptcy
law ever since the Supreme Court described the Code as providing “the
honest but unfortunate debtor . . . a new opportunity in life and a clear field
for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of
preexisting debt.”60 A former debtor’s post-discharge productivity can be
valuable;61 bankruptcy laws, in turn, appreciate these post-discharge social
gains more than binding debtors indefinitely to their creditors.62
Bankruptcy scholarship has justified this policy in various ways.63
55. Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’
Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 859–68 (1982).
56.
Since tax authorities are creditors of practically every taxpayer . . . tax collection
rules for bankruptcy cases have a direct impact on the integrity of the Federal,
State and local tax systems. . . . To the extent that debtors in a bankruptcy are freed
from paying their tax liabilities, the burden of making up the revenues thus lost
must be shifted to other taxpayers.
S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 14 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5800.
57. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(D) (2006) (waiving the filing requirement for
governmental agencies that seek repayment of their second priority administrative expenses);
id. § 1305(a) (allowing government agencies to file postpetition claims for taxes);
id. § 502(b)(9) (extending the bar date for proofs of government tax claims); FED. R. BANKR.
P. 3002(c) (same).
58. Ordinary creditors must generally submit a proof of claim within ninety days of the
first meeting of the creditors; the bar date for claims submitted by a governmental
organization is 180 days, a deadline that courts may further extend for cause. FED. R. BANKR.
P. 3002(c); see also 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(9).
59. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B) describes that administrative priority claims include
postpetition taxes incurred by the estate. Congress amended that provision to clarify that “a
governmental unit shall not be required to file a request for the payment of an expense . . . as
a condition of its being an allowed administrative expense.” 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(D).
60. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
61. See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 367 (1999) (noting,
within a discussion about crises triggered by bad lenders and bad borrowers, “You want
people to take advantage of leverage. You want people to take risks—even crazy risks. This
is how fledgling enterprises get funded and either go bankrupt or turn into Microsoft”).
62. Lee Dembart & Bruce A. Markell, Alive at 25? A Short Review of the Supreme
Court’s Bankruptcy Jurisprudence, 1979–2004, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 373, 376 (2004).
63. See, e.g., Kenneth Ayotte, Bankruptcy and Entrepreneurship: The Value of a Fresh
Start, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 161 (2006) (looking at the debtor’s fresh start in an
entrepreneurial context); Dembart & Markell, supra note 62, at 376 (“As a country, we not
only acknowledge failure, but accommodate it, and calculate that the societal gains from
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Although the Code hopes to address all of a debtor’s claims in
bankruptcy, when the creditor of a contested claim is a taxing authority, the
implications for third parties further complicate the calculus. On one hand,
the public has a social interest in ensuring that all taxpayers pay their
taxes.64 On the other hand, while the Code’s accommodation of the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and other taxing authorities may benefit
taxpayers, this occurs at the expense of other non-governmental creditors.65
Priority status and permissive filing deadlines combine to leave ordinary
creditors and especially those with unsecured claims further down the
distribution chain.
The challenge for courts adjudicating bankruptcy proceedings is to
properly balance the inherently conflicting interests of creditors and
66
debtors.
This Note revisits these policies when considering the
consequences of declaring contested income taxes a dischargeable
67
prepetition claim or a nondischargeable postpetition claim.
C. The Bankruptcy Estate
As part of the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980,68 the tax code began to apply
special rules to the bankruptcy estates of individual filers under chapters 7
and 11. When an individual files a petition under chapter 11 or chapter 7,
the Code treats the subsequently created bankruptcy estate as a separate
taxable entity.69 The Internal Revenue Code (IRC) allows these debtors to
make a short-year election, which treats the debtor’s taxable year as two
separate taxable years, one ending the day before the bankruptcy begins and
the other beginning on the date the case commences.70 That election,
returning debtors to society to be productive outweigh the gains to creditors from keeping
debtors in bondage.”); Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98
HARV. L. REV. 1393 (1985) (using a normative model to justify the bankruptcy discharge).
64. S. REP. NO. 95-598, at 14 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5800. The
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) estimates that the gross tax gap, the difference between what
taxpayers legally owe and what they pay on time, was $345 billion for the 2001 taxable year.
Even after accounting for late but voluntary payments and IRS enforcement actions, the
estimated net tax gap for the same year was $290 billion, over seventy percent of which the
IRS attributes to the individual income tax. OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR REDUCING THE TAX GAP 5 (2006). The
majority of federal revenue derives from individual income tax, which is then spent on
various programs including Social Security, Medicare, national defense, education, and
transportation, among others. See Fact Sheet on the Economics of Taxation, U.S.
DEPARTMENT
OF
THE
TREASURY,
http://www.ustreas.gov/education/factsheets/taxes/economics.shtml (last visited Oct. 23, 2010).
65. See Gregory Germain, Discharging Income Tax Liabilities in Bankruptcy: A
Challenge to the New Theory of Strict Construction for Scrivener’s Errors, 75 UMKC L.
REV. 741, 755–56 (2007) (describing how debtors who invoke the assessable-within-240days priority rule for income tax liability can reduce funds available to compensate
unsecured creditors).
66. Energy Res. Co. v. IRS (In re Energy Res. Co.), 871 F.2d 223, 230 (1st Cir. 1989)
(noting that the Code’s twin purposes are “often conflicting”), aff’d 495 U.S. 545 (1990).
67. See infra Part III.B–C.
68. Pub. L. No. 96-589, 94 Stat. 3389.
69. I.R.C. § 1398 (2006).
70. Id. § 1398(d)(2)(A).
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among other things, allows debtors to allocate their tax burden
corresponding to income earned postpetition to the bankruptcy estate.71
The estate for chapter 13 filers, however, resembles that of corporations and
partnerships filing under chapter 11: all are excluded from opting to apply
this short-year election.72 The legislative history behind the short-year
election suggests that it was meant to benefit individuals,73 making the
exclusion of chapter 13 filers slightly puzzling. After all, only individuals
(or couples) may file under chapter 13.
Then again, the chapter 13 estate is functionally different from the estate
in chapters 7 or 11. Bankruptcies under chapters 7 or 11 allocate a debtor’s
prepetition property to the bankruptcy estate while preserving postpetition
property in the individual.74 The chapter 13 estate is more ambitious. It
encompasses not only all of the property noted in Code § 541 but also the
debtor’s property and earnings acquired while the case is pending.75 In
particular, the debtor entrusts a designated portion of his income to the
bankruptcy trustee for the duration of the case.76 As a result, the chapter 13
bankruptcy estate has no separate taxable identity77—an operative
distinction acknowledged by the legislative history.78
In light of this history, courts are reluctant to allow chapter 13 debtors to
make a short-year election absent an expression of congressional intent, a
decision that complicates the treatment of petition-year income tax liability
for debtors who file under chapter 13.79 Given the Code’s distinguished
71. Jacob L. Todres, Corporate Bankruptcy: Treatment of Filing Year Income Tax—A
Suggested Approach, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 523, 550 (2001). Postpetition tax incurred
by the estate garners second priority administrative status. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2).
72. See I.R.C. § 1399; MCQUEEN & WILLIAMS, supra note 31, § 6.10.
73. S. REP. NO. 96-1035, at 5 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7017, 7020
(“[T]he bill [for the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980] generally gives an individual debtor an
election to close his or her taxable year as of the day the bankruptcy case commences.”).
74. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (describing preserved property).
75. See MCQUEEN & WILLIAMS, supra note 31, § 6:09. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1306
(noting that, in addition to § 541 property, property in the chapter 13 estate includes all
specified property acquired "after the commencement of the case but before the case is
closed, dismissed, or converted" and "earnings from services performed"), with id. § 541
(listing property assumed by the estates in all voluntary, joint, and involuntary banckruptcy
cases).
76. 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(2).
77. S. REP. NO. 96-1035, at 4 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7017, 7020 (“[N]o
separate taxable entity is created by commencement of a bankruptcy case in which the debtor
is an individual in a case under chapter 13 . . . .”).
78. See id. at 25, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7017, 7040 n.2 (rationalizing the
different treatment of estates because chapter 13 debtors may continue to earn income and
apply those assets toward repaying creditors).
79. See In re Wilkoff, No. 09-34354, 2001 WL 91624, at *7–9 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001)
(holding that the entire balance of a petition-year income tax claim was an unsecured
postpetition claim without priority status); In re Michaelson, 200 B.R. 862, 866 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1996) (applying circuit precedent established in the context of corporate bankruptcy to
a chapter 13 case when recognizing eighth priority for the petition-year taxes attributed to
the period before filing for bankruptcy); Germain, supra note 54, at 393–97. Because the
Code views the bankruptcy estates in corporate chapter 11 and individual chapter 13 cases
similarly, courts’ treatment of corporate bankruptcies can be instructive. For a discourse on
the judicial struggle to analyze petition-year tax liability in a corporate chapter 11 context,
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discharge practices for prepetition and postpetition claims, chapter 13 filers
unable to truncate their tax year may be forced to litigate the status of
petition-year and pre-petition-year tax liability.80
D. Treatment of Claims in Chapter 13
A combination of provisions in the Bankruptcy Code and the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure governs the process by which claims are
included in a chapter 13 debt repayment plan. In the cases described in Part
II, the central disagreement between the debtor and the creditor-tax
agencies is whether income tax claims that had been improperly filed by the
creditor were postpetition claims within the meaning of § 1305(a).81
Because the chapter 13 superdischarge permits the discharge of certain
claims that would ordinarily qualify for priority82 (but only if they arose
prepetition), courts may discharge improperly filed prepetition tax claims
once the debtor completes his bankruptcy plan.83 By contrast, postpetition
In the narrow factual
claims are generally non-dischargeable.84
circumstances addressed by the courts in Part II, the ruling on claim status
effectively determined the dischargeability of the claim.85 Part I.D provides
the statutory background needed to classify and distinguish taxes owed
during the prepetition and postpetition periods, and it serves as a foundation
for the subsequent discussion.
1. Defining Claims in Bankruptcy Proceedings
When Congress passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,86 it broadly
defined “claim” as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced
to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured,
unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.”87
Congress affirmed that the expansive language reflected its intent,
remarking that “all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote or

see Graham Stieglitz, Stuck in the Middle Again! How To Treat Straddle-Year Income Taxes
in a Corporate Chapter 11 Reorganization, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 467 (2001)
(describing various arguments proposed by the courts to reconcile a corporation’s petitionyear tax liability); Todres, supra note 71, at 553 (proposing a solution to the tension between
treatment of corporate petition-year tax liability by the Bankruptcy and Internal Revenue
Codes).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Ripley (In re Ripley), 926 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1991); In re
Ryan, 78 B.R. 175 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1987); In re Rothman, 76 B.R. 38 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1987).
81. See infra Part II.
82. See infra Part I.D.2.a, Part I.D.3.a.
83. See infra text accompanying notes 123–36.
84. See infra text accompanying notes 165–70.
85. See infra Part II.A (for the Ripley context), Part II.B (for the Joye context).
86. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
87. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2006); see also Thomas E. Plank, Bankruptcy and
Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1063, 1104 (2002). The Code also considers the “right to
an equitable remedy for breach of performance” to be a claim. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(B).
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contingent, will be able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy case. It permits
the broadest possible relief in the bankruptcy court.”88
Both the Code and the accompanying legislative history demonstrate that
claims include contingent claims that have not yet accrued before the case
commenced.89 This definition is significant. Tax claims can be contingent
but valid prepetition claims based on a debtor’s statutory duty to pay taxes,
even if a taxing authority has yet to make a formal assessment after the
filing date.90
The Code distinguishes between prepetition claims, which arise before
the debtor files his bankruptcy petition, and postpetition claims, which arise
after.91 Consequently, most courts’ discussions of § 1305 depends on
whether a provision that applies solely to postpetition claims should be
applied to the tax claim at issue or, in short, whether a claim was indeed a
postpetition claim.92 A court’s ruling that a claim arose prepetition could
prove fatal to a creditor’s attempt to recover it.
The following discussion provides an overview of prepetition claims and
postpetition claims, and the priority, filing, and discharge provisions that
apply to each. Part I.D.2 describes the Code provisions and Rules that
apply to prepetition claims, while Part I.D.3 provides a parallel discussion
for claims that arise postpetition.
2. Prepetition Claims
Though not explicitly defined in the Code, prepetition claims are those
that are incurred and owed before a debtor files his bankruptcy petition.93
In addition, one part of the Code, § 502(i), states that certain debt—tax
claims incurred by a debtor prepetition but that “arise” after the filing
date—should be treated as prepetition claims.94 This has been interpreted
to mean that “only taxes incurred by the debtor prepetition but not
becoming due and payable until after the petition is filed” are essentially
prepetition claims under this statute.95 The general rule asserts that a tax
liability incurred during the prepetition period is not a postpetition claim
“even though a return of or payment on such tax claim is not due until after

88. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 309 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6266.
89. See id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (defining “claim”).
90. See Goldston v. United States (In re Goldston), 104 F.3d 1198 (10th Cir. 1997).
91. Compare infra Part I.D.2 (describing Code's treatment of prepetition claims), with
infra Part I.D.3 (describing Code's treatment, or lack thereof, for postpetition claims).
92. Compare Joye v. Franchise Tax Bd. (In re Joye), 578 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2009)
(holding § 1305 was inapplicable to what it determined was a prepetition claim), with United
States v. Ripley (In re Ripley), 926 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding claim arose
postpetition and thus, § 1305 applied).
93. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1301 (9th ed. 2009) (“Occurring before the filing of
a petition (esp. in bankruptcy).”).
94. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(i) (“A claim that does not arise until after the commencement of
the case for a tax entitled to priority under section 507(a)(8) . . . shall be allowed . . . or
disallowed . . . the same as if such claim had arisen before the date of the filing of the
petition.”).
95. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 37, ¶ 502.10[2].
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the petition is filed.”96 This statement appears to reference pre-petitionyear tax liability. However, when part, but not all, of a claim was incurred
before the petition was filed, creditors and debtors may contest the status of
that petition-year claim.
a. Priority
All chapter 13 plans must propose to fully compensate the holders of
priority claims unless the creditor agrees otherwise.97 The standard for
creditor agreement tends to vary by court.98 Section 507 of the Code
determines whether a claim merits priority status, an outcome that
determines the order of claim repayment.99 Income tax claims usually
receive eighth priority if: (1) including extensions, a return for the taxes
was due in the three years preceding the filing date (essentially, a three-year
statute of limitations);100 (2) the taxing agency assessed the tax within 240
days of the petition-filing date;101 or (3) the tax was assessable
postpetition.102 Based on the statute, most income taxes, except those that
are “stale,” qualify as a priority claim.103 Thus, in most cases, a debtor’s

96. Id. ¶ 502.10[1], at 502-73.
97. See 7 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 2, § 146:12, at 146-59 to 146-60. That
mandate emerged in the 2005 Amendments, where Congress eliminated some of the benefits
of filing under chapter 13. Just a few of these changes include limiting the breadth of the
chapter 13 superdischarge, 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a); creating additional administrative and
payment obligations, 11 U.S.C. §§ 521, 1308, 1326(a); and adding restrictions for debtors
that refile or convert to chapter 7, 11 U.S.C §§ 362(c)(3)–(4), 348(f). See also 1 SOMMER,
supra note 25, at 287.
98. See 7 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 2, § 149:4, at 149-12 to 149-13 nn.4–5 (listing
cases). Some courts deem a creditor’s failure to object as “agreement” while others require
an express agreement by the creditor. Compare In re Puckett, 193 B.R. 842 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1996) (failure to object at confirmation, or to appeal a confirmation order, precludes a later
challenge to chapter 13 plan), and In re Hebert, 61 B.R. 44 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986)
(creditor's failure to object to a plan's treatment of its claim constitutes assent to such
treatment), with In re Smith, 212 B.R. 830 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997) (failure to object to plan
is insufficient to meet consent requirement), and In re Northrup, 141 B.R. 171
(N.D. Iowa 1991) (requiring an "express affirmation of consent").
99. 11 U.S.C. § 507.
100. Id. § 507(a)(8)(A)(i). As noted in the Code’s legislative history, the Internal
Revenue Code (IRC) provides taxing authorities with “three years to pursue delinquent
debtors . . . . If a debtor files bankruptcy before that three-year period has run, the taxing
authority is given a priority in order to compensate for its temporarily disadvantaged
position.” H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 190 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6150.
This history, which recognizes that taxing authorities are involuntary creditors, provides
perspective for the three-year statute of limitations for income tax claims when determining
eighth priority status. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 37, ¶ 507.11[1][b].
101. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(ii).
102. Id. § 507(a)(8)(A)(iii).
103. See id. § 507(a)(8); see also Geoff Giles, The New Bankruptcy Law: Bad News for
Debtors, Worse News for Lawyers, 13 NEV. LAW. 8, 8 (2005) (using the phrase “stale
taxes”); Carl M. Jenks, The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005: Summary of Tax Provisions, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 893, 899–901 (2005) (describing the
BAPCPA changes to the priority status of stale tax claims).
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bankruptcy plan should fully provide for income tax claims accorded
priority status in the chapter 13 plan.104
b. Filing Rules
All claims must be filed within the time frame designated by the Code
and Rules. Although the Code only notes that a creditor “may” file a proof
of claim,105 the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure create an explicit
requirement.106 Rule 3002(c) decrees that, for ordinary creditors, a proof of
claim must be filed within ninety days of the first meeting of the
creditors.107
Prepetition claims submitted by governmental entities, however, benefit
from a more flexible standard. Governed by the exception in Rule
3002(c)(1), governmental units generally may submit a proof of claim
within 180 days and still be timely.108 Moreover, if a debtor files his tax
return after the 180-day governmental filing deadline has passed, the taxing
authority may file a proof of claim within sixty days of the date on which
the debtor filed his return.109 Finally, courts will provide taxing authorities
additional time to file a proof of claim if they show “cause.” Essentially,
Rule 3002(c) treats proof of tax claims uniquely because the government’s
deadline for submitting its claim should be relative to when the debtor
submits his return.110 Notwithstanding these accommodations, if a claim is
filed late, it will be disallowed.111
Despite being timely filed, a claim may be disallowed for a variety of
other reasons.112 In addition, courts may disallow claims for reasons
hinging on bankruptcy-specific policies, such as claims for postpetition
interest,113 certain employment claims,114 and damages derived from a
dispute over leased property.115

104. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2).
105. See 11 U.S.C. § 501.
106. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002(a) (“An unsecured creditor or an equity security holder must
file a proof of claim or interest for the claim or interest to be allowed . . . .”). Rule 3002(a)
excepts certain claims from the filing requirement: claims filed before a case is converted to
chapter 7, see FED. R. BANKR. P. 1019(3), and claims filed on behalf of the creditor by a
debtor, trustee, guarantor, surety, endorser, or other co-debtor from the proof of claim
requirement, see FED. R. BANKR. P. 3004–05.
107. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002(c).
108. Id. 3002(c)(1).
109. Id.
110. See id.
111. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(9) (2006); TABB, supra note 19, at 489, 491.
112. Substantive non-bankruptcy reasons could include the lack of an enforceable claim
(which could be due to usury, material breach, or the expiration of the statute of limitations,
among others). 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 37, ¶ 502.03[2][b][ii], at 502-22 to
502-23 (usury); TABB, supra note 19, at 488.
113. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2); TABB, supra note 19, at 488–89.
114. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(7); TABB, supra note 19, at 490–91.
115. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6); TABB, supra note 19, at 489–90.
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Although Rule 3002 requires a creditor to file a proof of claim, the
standard for what constitutes “proof” is quite low.116 A writing that
demonstrates both a debt against the estate and an intent to hold the estate
liable will be accepted if fair and filed with the bankruptcy court.117
Moreover, although prepetition creditors are responsible for submitting
proofs of their claims, if a creditor fails to do so before the bar date, the
debtor or the trustee may do so on the creditor’s behalf.118 In fact, unless
disputed, contingent or unliquidated prepetition claims are “deemed” filed if
a debtor or the bankruptcy trustee lists the claim on the schedule filed with
the court.119
Reflecting the Code’s effort to make bankruptcy as comprehensive as
possible for individual debtors, the Code inclusively admits claims in a
chapter 13 plan: absent an objection by a “party in interest,”120 a claim will
be “deemed allowed.”121 While priority status increases the odds that a
claim in bankruptcy will be repaid, not even priority tax claims can survive
an agency’s failure to file a timely proof of claim.122 As a result, any
uncertainty or ambiguity regarding a government agency’s timeline for
submitting a proof of claim can lead to the incongruous results emerging
from the courts.
c. Dischargeability
Properly classifying tax claims is essential to determining their
dischargeability. According to the Code, in most cases, both secured claims
116. See In re Boehm, 255 B.R. 686 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2000) (declaring that the IRS’s
“penalty” claim did not require supporting documentation to constitute valid proof of claim);
United States v. Braunstein (In re Pan), 209 B.R. 152 (D. Mass. 1997) (holding that, by
submitting IRS Form 4340, the IRS had provided presumptive proof of a valid tax
assessment and sufficient proof of a claim).
117. Pizza of Haw., Inc. v. Shakey’s, Inc. (In re Pizza of Haw., Inc.), 761 F.2d 1374,
1381 (9th Cir. 1985); In re Pan, 209 B.R. at 155.
118. 11 U.S.C. § 501(c). In a chapter 13 proceeding, it is in the debtor’s interest to
include as many claims as possible.
119. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 37, ¶ 501.01[3][c].
120. In a chapter 13 proceeding, the “party in interest” includes the trustee, the debtor,
and creditors, who may in limited circumstances object to the claim of another creditor. See
id. ¶ 502.02[2]. Although the bankruptcy trustee is the “primary spokesman” for all
creditors in a bankruptcy case, when the trustee does not act or a creditor’s rights are directly
affected by a claim, the creditor may voice his objection. Id. ¶ 502.02[2][d]; see also Kowal
v. Malkemus (In re Thompson), 965 F.2d 1136 (1st Cir. 1992); In re Simon, 179 B.R. 1, 6–7
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1995).
121. 11 U.S.C. § 502(a).
122. See, e.g., In re Miller, 90 B.R. 317 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1988) (refusing to allow the
IRS to file a late amendment of proof of penalty claim in a chapter 13 case); In re Burrell, 85
B.R. 799 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988) (refusing to recognize the IRS’s undersecured and
unsecured income tax claims in a chapter 13 case because, despite proper notice, the Service
did not file a proof of claim before the bar date); In re Ryan, 78 B.R. 175 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1987) (discharging four years of prepetition tax debt because the IRS failed to file a proof of
claim); In re Rothman, 76 B.R. 38, 41 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987) (discharging prepetition taxes
for which the New York State Tax Commission did not file an amended proof of claim);
Richards v. United States (In re Richards), 50 B.R. 339 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985)
(discharging a tax penalty claim entitled to priority status because it had been filed late).
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and priority claims should be fully repaid under the chapter 13 plan.123
However, prepetition claims that were not included in the plan yet were
entitled to priority status may be discharged.124 This can occur when a
creditor does not submit a timely proof of claim125 or agrees to accept less
than full compensation through the debt repayment plan.126 Instances of
debtor misconduct—including failure to file a tax return, fraud, or willful
tax evasion—will make a tax claim nondischargeable.127
One of the benefits for the chapter 13 filer is the “superdischarge,” the
broadest discharge of debts available in the Code.128 When debts in a
bankruptcy proceeding are discharged, the debtor is no longer obliged to
repay that debt, and the creditor is prohibited from trying to recoup its
loss.129 In a chapter 7 liquidation, priority tax liabilities are among the
laundry list of debts excepted from discharge.130
By contrast, the chapter 13 superdischarge extinguishes a greater range of
prepetition debt, including certain income tax claims entitled to priority.131
This is apparent upon reading the exceptions to discharge provision
alongside the two statutes it incorporates by reference, Code § 507(a)(8)—
the priority provision—and Code § 1328(a)—the chapter 13 discharge
provision. Priority unsecured income tax claims in chapter 13 are only
nondischargeable under a chapter 13 hardship discharge;132 the provision is
not applicable to debtors who faithfully complete their repayment plans.133

123. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2) (declaring that the default recovery for § 507 priority
claims is full compensation); id. § 1325(a)(5) (outlining terms of recovery for secured
creditors, essentially, the face value of the claim or the property securing the claim).
124. See supra note 122 (describing cases where tax claims entitled to priority were not
allowed in a chapter 13 proceeding).
125. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1328(a), 502(b)(9).
126. See 7 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 2, § 149:4, at 149-12 to 149-13 n.5 (listing
cases).
127. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1328(a)(2), 523(a)(1)(B)–(C).
128. See supra note 49 and accompanying text for a more detailed description of what the
superdischarge accomplishes and how BAPCPA pared down the provisions of this
discharge.
129. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2). Note, however, that although a creditor may not actively
pursue the debtor to have its claim repaid, the debtor may, of his own volition, choose to
repay that debt. See id. § 524(f).
130. Id. § 727(b) (incorporating by reference the exceptions to discharge in § 523);
id. § 523(a)(1)(A) (stating that a chapter 7 discharge will not discharge taxes specified in
507(a)(8)—essentially, eighth priority unsecured tax claims).
131. See id. § 1328(a). Some forms of debt, for example, domestic support obligations,
remain nondischargeable despite the superdischarge. Id. § 523(a)(5).
132. Id. § 1328(b)–(c) (describing the chapter 13 hardship discharge and noting that such
discharge does not discharge claims “of a kind specified in section 523(a) of this title”);
id. § 523(a)(1)(A) (excepting from the 1328(b) hardship discharge those tax claims specified
in § 507(a)(8)); id. § 507(a)(8) (delineating tax claims entitled to eighth priority); see also
MCQUEEN & WILLIAMS, supra note 31, § 10:12. A hardship discharge is appropriate for a
debtor who failed to complete the repayment plan due to circumstances beyond his control.
11 U.S.C. § 1328(b).
133. Id. § 523(a) (omitting any mention of the traditional chapter 13 superdischarge in
§ 1328(a) when excepting eighth priority income tax liability from bankruptcy discharges
under specified sections of the Code).
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The combined reading of the statutes leads to the conclusion that
prepetition income tax claims are dischargeable, for example, if they were
improperly or untimely filed yet scheduled by the debtor or the trustee in
the bankruptcy plan.134 As described earlier, courts have discharged a
debtor’s prepetition tax debt when a taxing agency failed to meet the filing
These circumstances lead parties to litigate the
deadlines.135
dischargeability of tax debt, even for claims entitled to priority.136
3. Postpetition Claims
The Code treats claims differently depending on whether they arose
prepetition or postpetition. Unfortunately, as some commentators have
noted, many bankruptcy provisions do not expressly address how a chapter
13 bankruptcy should treat claims that arise postpetition.137 This silence
perpetuates confusion regarding postpetition claims, especially since the
Code permits the chapter 13 debtor to, in certain circumstances, allocate
some of his disposable income to repay postpetition claims.138 Contrary to
the Code’s permissive treatment of prepetition claims, postpetition claims
are allowed only in limited instances. According to § 1305:
Filing and allowance of postpetition claims.
(a) A proof of claim may be filed by any entity that holds a claim
against the debtor—
(1) for taxes that become payable to a governmental unit while the
case is pending; . . .
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, a claim filed
under subsection (a) of this section shall be allowed or disallowed . . . the
same as if such claim had arisen before the date of the filing of the
petition.139

Section 1305 only accommodates two sorts of claims: (1) taxes that
become payable during the pending bankruptcy, and (2) certain consumer
debt.140 Only the first is relevant to this Note. The language of this statute,
and in particular, that of § 1305(a)(1), will inform courts’ analyses as to
when a tax claim is properly classified as a postpetition claim.

134.
135.
136.
137.

See id. § 1328(a).
See supra note 122.
See infra Part II.A–B and accompanying text.
See 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 37, ¶¶ 1305.01–1305.02; 7 NORTON &
NORTON, supra note 2, § 146:19, at 146-84 (noting that the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure provide inadequate guidance on filing postpetition claims).
138. See 11 U.S.C. § 1305.
139. Id.
140. Where possible, the holder of a claim for consumer debt should secure the trustee’s
approval before further indebting the chapter 13 filer; should the creditor fail to do so, the
court may reject the postpetition claim for consumer debt. See id. § 1305(c).
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a. Priority
As mentioned above, a debtor’s chapter 13 plan must fully provide for
tax claims accorded priority status in deferred payments for the duration of
the plan term unless the tax agency agrees otherwise.141 For chapter 13
filers, the Code is virtually silent regarding tax liability post-confirmation,
mentioning postpetition tax claims only in the context of § 1305(a).142
The priority provision in § 507(a), however, suggests that postpetition
income tax claims would not merit priority status, a conclusion confirmed
by various courts.143 Tax claims are mentioned in two of the priority
provisions in Code § 507(a). Postpetition tax claims might be entitled to
second priority under Code § 507(a)(2) if they were an administrative
expense incurred by the estate.144 This has been an issue when the
contested tax liability is a petition-year claim. But, unlike other consumer
bankruptcy proceedings, the chapter 13 case creates no separate taxable
bankruptcy estate.145 As at least some of the tax liability incurred during
the petition-year is incurred by the debtor before the bankruptcy
proceeding, it cannot properly be labeled an administrative expense of the
bankruptcy estate.146 Granted, § 507(a)(2) gives certain taxes “incurred by
However, because the
the estate” administrative claim status.147
bankruptcy estate is not formed until the petition is filed, tax liability
incurred before filing for bankruptcy is neither “incurred by the estate” nor
an administrative expense.148 The liability for such petition-year taxes lies
with the debtor alone.149
Income tax claims can also secure eighth priority status under Code
§ 507(a)(8). However, “eighth-priority taxes are in some way attributable
to the prepetition period.”150 Indeed, the statutory language appears to
141. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2); supra notes 97–104 and accompanying text.
142. Although chapter 12 has a section that describes “Special Tax Provisions,” chapter
13 has no equivalent. See 11 U.S.C. § 1231.
143. See 7 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 2, § 146:12, at 146-61 to 146-65 (“As a
general rule, postpetition claims under § 1305 for . . . taxes after the petition have been
refused administrative expense status in Chapter 13 cases.); see also In re Gyulafia, 65 B.R.
913, 915 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1986) (holding that Code § 503 second priority administrative
expense status was inapplicable to postpetition taxes in a chapter 13 case); In re Wright, 66
B.R. 125, 127 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1984) (finding that taxes incurred while chapter 13 case is
pending do not receive administrative priority but must be treated as if claim had arisen
prepetition, as in Code § 1305(b)).
144. See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B)(i) (“[T]here shall be allowed administrative expenses
. . . including . . . any tax incurred by the estate . . . except a tax of a kind specified in section
507(a)(8).”); id. § 507(a)(2).
145. See supra Part I.C.
146. See In re Clayburn, 112 B.R. 434, 435 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1990) (discussing when a
postpetition claim can be considered an administrative expense).
147. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2).
148. See id. § 503(b)(1)(B)(i); Todres, supra note 71, at 547.
149. See 3 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 2, § 49:22, at 49-146 (“[C]onfirmation of the
plan revests property of the estate in the debtor. Thus postconfirmation taxes are the liability
of the reorganized debtor, not the estate [and] are not recoverable administrative expenses.”);
see also supra Part I.C and accompanying text.
150. 3 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 2, § 49:49, at 49-250.
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preclude the consideration of any postpetition tax liability. As mentioned
earlier, income tax claims may be entitled to eighth priority status if the
taxes satisfy one of the three scenarios outlined in the statute.151 Both the
first and the second—a return was due in the three years prior to or the tax
was assessed within 240 days of filing for bankruptcy—are backward
looking requirements that exclude postpetition claims.152 The final
scenario—taxes were not assessed before filing chapter 13, but were
assessable after the commencement of the case—tends to cover very old tax
liability.153 This usually includes taxes subject to audit or pending tax court
litigation.154 Each of these priority scenarios deals with taxes incurred prior
to a chapter 13 filing and necessarily excludes postpetition claims for tax
liability.
b. Filing Rules
Neither statutory language nor logic permits applying the prepetition rule
for filing a proof of claim to those claims that emerge during a pending
chapter 13 case.155 Noting that no Bankruptcy Rule or Code provision
governs the timing of postpetition claims, one commentator suggests that
creditors may file proof of their postpetition claims any time after the filing
date, so long as the court finds the timing of the claim reasonable.156
This Note addresses the issue of when taxes “become payable,” within
the meaning of § 1305(a)(1). Filing for bankruptcy conceptually bifurcates
the taxable year into two periods: (1) the prepetition period—taxes incurred
by income earned before the debtor filed his petition, and (2) the
postpetition period—taxes incurred by income earned after filing for
bankruptcy.157 Because chapter 13 filers cannot make a short-year
election,158 courts are forced to adjudicate the status of petition-year tax
liability.159
Although § 1305 provides a vehicle by which governmental entities can
submit proofs of postpetition tax claims, the government is not obligated to

151. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A); 3 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 2, § 49:50, at 49252 to 49-258; supra notes 100–03 and accompanying text.
152. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(i)–(ii); see also 3 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 2,
§ 49:50, at 49-253 to 49-254.
153. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(iii); see also 3 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 2, § 49:50,
at 49-255.
154. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 37, ¶ 507.11[2][c].
155. See 7 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 2, § 146:19, at 146-84 to 146-85.
156. See 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 37, ¶ 1305.02 (noting that the Code
appears to impose no deadline for the filing of postpetition claims).
157. See Germain, supra note 54, at 330.
158. I.R.C. §§ 1398(a), 1399 (2006) (Section 1399 precludes taxpayers—except those
governed by § 1398—from creating separate taxable entities; the § 1398 rules apply only to
individuals filing for bankruptcy under chapters 7 and 11 of the Code); see supra notes 69–
78 and accompanying text.
159. See United States v. Ripley (In re Ripley), 926 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1991)
(adjudicating chapter 13 debtors’ petition-year tax liability); In re Ryan, 78 B.R. 175 (Bankr.
E.D. Tenn. 1987) (same).
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do so.160 According to commentators, only the holder of a postpetition
claim may file proof of that claim;161 courts have agreed, holding that
proofs of claim for postpetition tax liability submitted by the debtor or the
bankruptcy trustee are invalid.162 When a tax agency files a proof of claim,
however, it does not necessarily follow that a court will unilaterally allow
that claim. The debtor exercises control over the plan and may choose to
exclude the postpetition claim from his repayment plan.163 As applied, only
by mutual consent of both the debtor and creditor can a postpetition claim
be incorporated into a chapter 13 debt repayment plan.164
c. Dischargeability
The holder of a postpetition claim is faced with two options. First,
the creditor may file a postpetition claim under § 1305 and, assuming the
debtor includes the claim, recover under the chapter 13 plan.165 The
creditor, however, is not obligated to file a § 1305 claim. As a second
option, the creditor may recover his debt independently against the debtor
outside of the bankruptcy proceeding.166 This second option is available
because claims that become payable after the bar date are neither covered

160. In re Rothman, 76 B.R. 38, 40 n.1 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987) (noting that “[t]he option
to file [under § 1305(a)(1)] and, thereby, to be paid under a plan lies with the taxing
authority”).
161. See, e.g., 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 37, ¶ 1305.02 (“[O]nly the holder
of this type of postpetition claim may file the claim and thereby choose to become involved
in the chapter 13 case.”); KEITH LUNDIN, CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY § 302.1, at 302-8 (3d ed.
2000) (“[T]here is no provision of the Code or Rules authorizing the debtor or the trustee to
file a proof of a postpetition claim. [With but one possible exception,] reported decisions
addressing the question have concluded that only the holder of a postpetition claim can file
proof of that claim.” (internal footnotes listing cases omitted)); 7 NORTON & NORTON, supra
note 2, § 146:19, at 146-83 to 146-84.
162. See In re Flores, 270 B.R. 203, 208–09 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2001) (holding that
debtors in a chapter 13 proceeding with sales tax liability could file proof of claim for tax
returns dated postpetition, claims for prepetition activity, and claims that were not timely
filed); In re Ryan, 78 B.R. at 184 (holding that Code § 1305(a)(1) gave the IRS the option of
collecting postpetition taxes from either the estate through the bankruptcy plan or directly
from the debtors); Hester v. Powell (In re Hester), 63 B.R. 607, 612 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1986) (“[P]ostpetition taxes can be discharged only by payment in full. Simply including
them in the plan is not enough; they must also be paid.”).
163. Because postpetition claims are allowed or disallowed in accordance with Code
§ 502, a party in interest (e.g., the debtor) can object to the inclusion of the claim in the debt
repayment plan. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(a), 1305(b) (2006); see also In re Jagours, 236 B.R.
616, 619 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1999) (“A debtor is not required under the Code to treat
[postpetition] claims.”); 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 37, ¶ 1322.10 (“If the plan
does not provide for postpetition claims, no such claims may be paid under the plan, even if
a postpetition creditor files a claim. Although the debtor may choose to amend the plan to
accommodate the postpetition claim, the debtor is not required to do so.”).
164. See In re Holmes, 312 B.R. 876, 878 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2004) (“In the absence of a
plan amendment and the voluntary filing of a claim, the postpetition tax debt will not be
dischargeable in this case.”); LUNDIN, supra note 161, § 350.1 n.18, at 350-4 to 350-6 (listing
a series of cases holding the same).
165. See 11 U.S.C. § 1305.
166. See 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 37, ¶ 1305.02.
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by the plan nor subject to the chapter 13 superdischarge.167 In practice,
creditors have no incentive to file a proof of postpetition claim unless the
debtor guarantees full repayment of that claim.168 However, once a
postpetition claim has been filed and provided for in the plan, unless of a
kind excepted from discharge,169 that claim is subject to chapter 13’s
generous discharge provisions.170
II. A PRESUMPTIVE SPLIT: RIPLEY AND JOYE
Viewed collectively, the concepts and statutory provisions described in
Part I form the backdrop in front of which courts grapple with how best to
classify claims. A court’s declaration that a claim arose prepetition or
postpetition can ultimately affect the dischargeability of a claim.171
Postpetition claims are those that “become payable” while a bankruptcy
case is pending.172 However, there is no legal consensus as to the critical
date when claims in a bankruptcy case “become payable.” Although the
subject of some disagreement among the bankruptcy courts,173 only
recently have the Courts of Appeals wrestled with the meaning of this
phrase in Code § 1305(a).174
Part II of this Note presents the Fifth and Ninth Circuit decisions,
respectively, which interpreted § 1305(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code
differently. In 1991, the Fifth Circuit in In re Ripley held that tax claims
“become payable” only after the tax return for that tax is due.175 This Note
refers to the application of this cutoff date (for when taxes “become
payable” and should therefore be declared a postpetition claim) as the “taxreturn rule.” Nearly twenty years later, the Ninth Circuit in In re Joye
interpreted the phrase “become payable” to mean that a claim becomes
payable once it is capable of being paid—in short, after the end of the
taxable year, for most individuals, December 31.176 This Note refers to this
more permissive standard as the “taxable-year rule.” Applying these rules
to the facts faced by each court, the Ripley and Joye courts issued divergent
opinions about whether a particular income tax claim arose prepetition or
postpetition.

167. See 7 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 2, § 153:5, at 153-22 to 153-23.
168. 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 37, ¶ 1305.03[3].
169. See 8 id. ¶ 1305.03[2].
170. See 8 id. ¶ 1305.03[1]; 7 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 2, § 153:5, at 153-21 to
153-22.
171. This applies in particular when a claim was improperly filed by the creditor, or when
the debtor or bankruptcy trustee scheduled the creditor’s claim but did not adequately
provide for it in the plan. See supra notes 44–45, 105–11.
172. See 11 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (2006).
173. Compare infra notes 223–25 and accompanying text, with infra note 226 and
accompanying text.
174. Compare infra Part II.A, with infra Part II.B.
175. United States v. Ripley (In re Ripley), 926 F.2d 440, 448 (5th Cir. 1991).
176. Joye v. Franchise Tax Bd. (In re Joye), 578 F.3d 1070, 1079 (9th Cir. 2009).
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A. The Tax-Return Rule in United States v. Ripley (In re Ripley)
James Ripley, a self-employed oral surgeon, and his wife, Dianne, filed a
chapter 13 petition in November 1987.177 The IRC requires self-employed
individuals who are not subject to income tax and Social Security
withholdings to pay an estimated tax in quarterly installments.178 The
Ripleys failed to make any of these payments prior to filing for bankruptcy.
The debt repayment plan they proposed included full payment of an
estimated $21,000 priority claim held by the IRS; the IRS, however, never
submitted a proof of claim within the bar date for governmental claims.179
Only after the Ripleys filed their end-of-year tax return, in May 1988, did
the IRS submit a proof of claim in the bankruptcy case, relying on
§ 1305(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.180 Contending that the tax liability had
“become payable” during the course of the bankruptcy proceeding, the IRS
argued that their claim was a valid postpetition claim under § 1305(a)(1).181
The Ripleys argued that their taxable year should be split. Though
conceding that a quarter of the tax assessmentthat which was incurred
after the petition filing datewas indeed valid,182 they also posited that
three-fourths of the IRS’s tax claim had become payable as the quarterly
installments had become due and was therefore untimely filed.183 Both the
bankruptcy court and the district court found the Ripleys’ argument to be
persuasive.184
The Fifth Circuit rejected the reasoning of the lower courts. From the
language of the statute, the court inferred that Congress’s use of the phrase
“become payable” referred to “those taxes that come due during the
pendency of the case; in other words, taxes that have ‘become payable’ are
those that must be paid now.”185 Highlighting parallels to other bodies of
law, the Fifth Circuit also noted that commercial paper payable to the bearer
“must be paid to the bearer or to the order of the person therein
specified.”186
As for whether the phrase might refer to taxes that a taxpayer was merely
capable of paying, the Fifth Circuit disagreed because such a construction
would contradict the traditional usage of the word “payable”:187 “justly
due” or “legally enforceable.”188 Without elaborating further, the court
declared that the only reasonable interpretation for when claims “become

177. In re Ripley, 926 F.2d at 441–42.
178. See I.R.C. § 6654 (1988).
179. In re Ripley, 926 F.2d at 442.
180. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (2006).
181. See In re Ripley, 926 F.2d at 442.
182. See id. at 442 n.8.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 442–43.
185. Id. at 444. Despite reaching a different conclusion as to how the taxes should have
been classified, the court agreed with the lower courts’ conclusions that “payable” meant
“due and owing.” See id. at 444 n.14.
186. Id. at 444 (citing U.C.C. §§ 3-110, 3-111).
187. Id.
188. Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1128 (6th ed. 1990)).
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payable” within the meaning of § 1305(a) was when they became legally
enforceable, which occurred once the tax return was due.189 Applying the
tax-return rule, the Fifth Circuit decided that the contested 1987 income tax
claim became payable postpetition; effectively, it was a nondischargeable
postpetition claim.190
It also relied heavily on IRC provisions to justify why taxes “become
payable” and are legally enforceable once the tax return is due.191 First, the
IRC sets the time frame for paying taxes as “the time and place fixed for
filing the return,”192 a provision the Fifth Circuit found demonstrated the
“annual nature of income . . . taxes.”193 Second, the IRC prohibits tax
assessment until the tax return has been filed.194 This limitation remains
true even for self-employed filers who have failed to make the requisite
quarterly payments.195 In practice, a better way of describing the quarterly
obligations would be as prepayments of tax, rather than payments of an
assessed tax. Third, estimated income tax prepayments, such as those owed
by the Ripleys, were also deemed payable on the due date for the tax
return.196 Fourth, although the IRS can impose a penalty for belated tax
prepayments, it cannot demand immediate penalty payments from a
taxpayer whose installment taxes are late.197 Finally, the Fifth Circuit
rejected the Ripleys’ contention that, since the IRS could impose a penalty
for underpayment of the installment as each quarterly due date passed, taxes
“become payable” the day after the IRS imposes this penalty.198 According
to the court, “the fact that penalties are imposed for underpayment of
installments does not alter either the annual nature of these taxes or the
language of § 6151 [of the IRC].”199 Noting that simply because “the
installments are due at the end of each quarter does not mean that the tax
itself is due at that time,”200 the Fifth Circuit seemed to equate, or at least
find highly interconnected, the concepts of tax assessment, the due date for
the return, and when tax claims “become payable.”
The Fifth Circuit also cited lower courts that had agreed that a tax
return’s due date best defines when taxes “become payable” under

189. See id.
190. See id. at 449.
191. See id. at 444–47.
192. I.R.C. § 6151 (2006).
193. In re Ripley, 926 F.2d at 444 (“‘[W]hen a return of tax is required under this title or
regulations, the person required to make such return shall, without assessment or notice and
demand from the Secretary, pay such tax to the internal revenue officer with whom the
return is filed, and shall pay such tax at the time and place fixed for filing the return.’”
(quoting I.R.C. § 6151 (1989))).
194. Id. at 445.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 447 (citing I.R.C. § 6513(b)(2) (1989)).
197. Id.
198. Id. (citing I.R.C. § 6654(a), (b) (1989)). Imposing a penalty payment is
distinguished from demanding payment of the penalty imposed. See id.
199. Id.
200. Id.

546

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

§ 1305.201 But the Ripleys contended that language in the Code, in
particular § 547, suggested otherwise: “a debt for a tax is incurred on the
day when such tax is last payable without penalty.”202 That provision lent
credence to the view that their installment taxes became payable
quarterly.203 The court, however, explicitly differentiated the due dates of
the quarterly payments from the due date of the tax itself,204 and further
concluded the Code provision was inapplicable because, when examined in
context, the provision served only to identify what types of antecedent tax
debt a bankruptcy trustee should not recover.205
The Fifth Circuit’s conclusion and heavy reliance on the IRC has been
replicated by other lower courts. For example, one court that also
distinguished when installments and the actual taxes are due noted that
“quarterly installment payments are merely prepayments, not payments of
the tax itself.”206 This argument has merit, especially when considering
that the quarterly tax payment is actually an estimated tax based on a
taxpayer’s earnings from the preceding year.207 An individual’s tax
liability could fluctuate wildly from one year to the next,208 justifying a
decision to limit tax assessment until after the tax return has been
submitted.209 Moreover, tax obligations can change in the interim between
the end of a taxable year and the date the tax return is due.210 Yet in its
sustained focus on IRC provisions that essentially bind a tax agency from
acting until after a tax return has been filed, the Fifth Circuit did not
consider that, in the bankruptcy context, a tax assessment is not a
prerequisite to submit a proof of claim.211
Additionally, Code provisions seem to distinguish between when claims
are “incurred” and when they “become payable,” treating claims that have
been incurred differently than those that have been assessed and due.212 In
201. Id. at 445–46 (describing similar holdings by the courts in In re Pennetta, 19 B.R.
794 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982), In re Rothman, 76 B.R. 38 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987), and In re
Ryan, 78 B.R. 175 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1987), while distinguishing the holding in In re
Miller, 90 B.R. 317 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1988), because it addressed an employer’s FICA
contributions, for which a tax return, and not merely an installment payment, is required on a
quarterly basis).
202. 11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(4) (2006).
203. In re Ripley, 926 F.2d at 447.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 447–48; see also 11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(4).
206. In re Wilkoff, No. 98-34354, 2001 WL 91624, at *5 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2001).
207. See I.R.C. § 6654(d) (2006) (noting that each quarterly payment should represent
one-fourth of a taxpayer’s estimated annual tax: the lesser of (1) ninety percent of the tax on
the previous year’s return, (2) ninety percent of the assessed tax for that year, or (3) one
hundred percent of the tax shown on the preceding year’s return).
208. Such fluctuation might occur when a taxpayer is unemployed in one year but not the
other, receives a significant bonus in one year but not the other, or earns a commission-based
salary.
209. See In re Ripley, 926 F.2d at 445 & n.18.
210. See Joye v. Franchise Tax Bd. (In re Joye), 578 F.3d 1070, 1083 (9th Cir. 2009)
(Graber, J., dissenting) (noting that deductible contributions that may lower the gross income
tax base can be made until the tax return is due (citing 26 U.S.C. § 219(a), (f)(3) (2006))).
211. See Goldston v. United States (In re Goldston), 104 F.3d 1198 (10th Cir. 1997).
212. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 502(i), with id. § 1305(a).
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the past, the IRS and other tax agencies have adopted the position that the
full amount of tax liability incurred in a taxable period is imputed to the
very last day of that period.213 For debtors whose income taxes are keyed
to the calendar year, this means that tax liability for an entire year would be
incurred on December 31 of that year, the last day of the taxable period,
even if it does not become payable until April of the following year.214 Yet
the Fifth Circuit’s analysis seemed to conflate the meanings of when taxes
become payable and when they are incurred,215 even as it rejected the use of
a taxable period’s final date as the critical moment at which claims “become
payable” within the meaning of Code § 1305.216
Another phrase prevalent in the IRC that could inform the discussion of
when tax claims “become payable” is “due and payable.”217 Although the
IRC does not define “due and payable,” according to one court, such a debt
is one that “is fixed and certain but the day appointed for its payment has
not yet arrived.”218 That definition precludes the proposed moment at
which the Fifth Circuit would declare claims to be payable: the tax return
due date. On that date, the day for payment has indeed arrived, with taxes
paid after that date subject to a penalty.219
In its analysis, the Fifth Circuit in Ripley appeared to defer to selected
IRC provisions that emphasized a tax return’s due date to construe the
phrase “become payable” in § 1305(a) as a parallel provision of sorts.
Certain IRC provisions, however, could just as plausibly be interpreted to
conflict with a tax-return rule.220 One court cautioned against over-relying
on IRC provisions to inform the understanding of the Code, stating that
“[w]ords used in the Bankruptcy Code do not necessarily mean what they
might mean in the Internal Revenue Code.”221 Likewise, extrapolating
prior judicial decisions where the IRC and the Code have intersected
213. See United States v. Hillsborough Holdings Corp. (In re Hillsborough Holdings
Corp.), 116 F.3d 1391, 1394 (11th Cir. 1997) (IRS argues tax liability was incurred on the
last day of the taxable period); Mo. Dep’t of Revenue v. L.J. O’Neill Shoe Co. (In re L.J.
O’Neill Shoe Co.), 64 F.3d 1146, 1148–49 (8th Cir. 1995) (state taxing authority asserts tax
was incurred on final day of taxable period); Towers v. United States (In re Pac.-Atl.
Trading Co.), 64 F.3d 1292, 1297 (9th Cir. 1995) (characterizing the government’s position
as advocating that the tax was incurred at the end of the taxable period in a corporate chapter
7 bankruptcy case); see also Stieglitz, supra note 79, at 477–78.
214. Stieglitz, supra note 79, at 478.
215. United States v. Ripley (In re Ripley), 926 F.2d 440, 447 (5th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he
Ripleys seem to argue that the tax ‘becomes payable’ (i.e. ‘is incurred’) at the end of each
quarter . . . .”).
216. Id. at 444.
217. Compare scattered sections of I.R.C. (incorporating the language of “due and
payable”), with 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) (sole use of “due and payable” language in
Bankruptcy Code appears in an exception to discharge for certain condo or homeowner
association fees that become “due and payable after the order for relief”).
218. See Beiger Heritage Corp. v. Montandon, 691 N.E.2d 1334, 1337 (Ind. App. 1998)
(quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 499 (6th ed. 1990)).
219. Once the tax return due date has passed, assuming one owes a tax, the IRC imposes a
penalty of 5% of tax owed for each month a return is late and 0.5% of tax owed for each
month the balance is outstanding. I.R.C. § 6651(a)(1)–(2) (2006).
220. See supra notes 212–19 and accompanying text.
221. Dixon v. IRS (In re Dixon), 218 B.R. 150, 152 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1998).
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reveals that, if the issue involves an important policy underlying bankruptcy
legislation, courts will apply the Code despite clear, yet contrary, IRC
provisions.222
The Ripley holding mirrored the conclusions of earlier bankruptcy court
decisions,223 and subsequent courts followed its lead in jurisdictions
inside224 and out of the Fifth Circuit.225 Despite broad adherence to
Ripley’s tax-return rule, the case has also been distinguished and criticized,
suggesting that its reading of § 1305(a) is a source of real disagreement in
the judiciary.226 Part II.B discusses some of the main objections to the Fifth
Circuit’s reading, as discussed primarily by the Ninth Circuit.
B. The Taxable-Year Rule in Joye v. Franchise Tax Board (In re Joye)
Shelli Renee and Teresa M. Joye, like the Ripleys, sought to enjoin a tax
agency from collecting taxes that they claimed had been discharged in their
chapter 13 bankruptcy case.227 The Joyes filed their chapter 13 bankruptcy
petition on March 7, 2001, when their 2000 state tax returns were not yet
due.228 Their filings indicated that they owed the California Franchise Tax
Board (Tax Board) an estimated priority claim of $10,000.229 Although the
Tax Board, like all scheduled creditors, was properly notified of the first
meeting of creditors and the bar date for governmental claims, it did not file
a proof of claim before that deadline.230 The Joyes completed their chapter
13 plan, and the bankruptcy court discharged the outstanding debt that had
been provided for by the plan.231

222. See Stieglitz, supra note 79, at 516 (“Even though the IRC was as clear as possible,
the bankruptcy court shifted the risk from the debtor to the IRS in basing its decision solely
on the Bankruptcy Code. This is a strong indication that when a conflict between the
Bankruptcy Code and the IRC exists and an important goal of bankruptcy could be
implicated the Bankruptcy Code will win out.” (citing United States v. Energy Res. Co., 495
U.S. 545 (1990))).
223. See, e.g., In re Ryan, 78 B.R. 175 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1987); In re Rothman, 76 B.R.
38 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987).
224. See, e.g., In re Jagours, 236 B.R. 616 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1999).
225. See, e.g., Savaria v. United States (In re Savaria), 317 B.R. 395 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
2004); Henkel v. United States (In re Carpenter), 367 B.R. 850 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006); In
re Holmes, 312 B.R. 876 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2004); In re Wilkoff, No. 98-34354, 2001 WL
91624 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2001); Pullman Constr. Indus. v. United States (In re
Pullman Constr. Indus.), 190 B.R. 618 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996), aff’d, 210 B.R. 302 (N.D. Ill.
1997); Matravers v. United States (In re Matravers), 149 B.R. 204 (Bankr. D. Utah 1993).
226. See, e.g., Joye v. Franchise Tax Bd. (In re Joye), 578 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2009); In
re Dixon, 218 B.R. 150; In re Flores, 270 B.R. 203 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2001); In re Jones, 164
B.R. 543 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1994).
227. In re Joye, 578 F.3d at 1072.
228. The Joyes filed their pre-petition-year tax return (for 2000 taxes) on October 15,
2001, and because California provides taxpayers filing personal income tax returns an
automatic six-month extension, the court noted that the Joyes’ return was timely filed. Id. at
1072–73.
229. Id. at 1072.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1073.
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Following that discharge, the Tax Board tried to collect the Joyes’ unpaid
income taxes from 2000.232 The Tax Board claimed that the tax claim
survived discharge for two reasons: it was a proper § 1305 postpetition
claim or, in the alternative, barring the Tax Board from collecting on its
debt would, due to constitutionally deficient notice, violate its right to due
process.233 The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the Joyes under both
theories, declaring the tax claim a prepetition claim discharged when the
Joyes completed their chapter 13 plan.234 The district court agreed that the
taxes constituted prepetition debt, yet ultimately ruled in favor of the Tax
Board so as not to deny it fundamental fairness under their inadequate
notice argument.235 When the Ninth Circuit finally considered the case, it
too agreed that the taxes were a prepetition claim, but reversed on the
second point and held that notice provided by scheduling the Tax Board as
a creditor was constitutionally adequate.236 Stating the Tax Board’s
reliance on § 1305 had been misplaced because the claim had “become
payable” prepetition, the court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s discharge.237
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by turning to the language of § 1305
and acknowledged that courts had attributed different meanings to the term
“payable.”238
After briefly conveying the Fifth Circuit’s main
arguments,239 it explained why it found the reasoning advanced by the
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in In re Dixon to be more persuasive.240 That
panel had concluded that claims become “payable” before “the last
permissible day for paying taxes,” which was anytime after the end of the
taxable year and before the tax return was due.241 In support, the Ninth
Circuit cited both the Code’s efforts to broadly discharge a debtor’s
obligations,242 as well as the Code’s inclusive definition of “claim,” a
designation that included contingent claims.243 To the Ninth Circuit,
“payable” was a term that described a class of claims, and it represented a
creditor’s right to payment even if it had yet to mature (and was therefore
not yet legally enforceable).244
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. According to the district court, merely scheduling the Tax Board as a creditor
did not meet the requirements of “constitutionally adequate notice.” Id.
236. Id. at 1081.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1075 (quoting United States v. Ripley (In re Ripley), 926 F.2d 440, 444 (5th
Cir. 1991) (“[T]axes that have ‘become payable’ are those that must be paid now.”); Dixon
v. IRS (In re Dixon), 218 B.R. 150, 152 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1998) (claims for payable taxes
“refer ‘to a time before the last permissible day for paying taxes’”)).
239. See supra Part II.A.
240. In re Joye, 578 F.3d at 1075.
241. In re Dixon, 218 B.R. at 152.
242. In re Joye, 578 F.3d at 1075 (citing In re Dixon, 218 B.R. at 152). See generally
Bein, supra note 49; Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48
OHIO ST. L.J. 1047 (1987).
243. In re Joye, 578 F.3d at 1075–76; see also supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text
(defining “claim”).
244. In re Joye, 578 F.3d at 1075–76.
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After determining that the more inclusive concept of when claims
“become payable” better embodied the Code’s discharge policies, the Ninth
Circuit turned its analysis to another Code provision, § 502(i).245 Section
502(i) refers to certain tax claims “that [do] not arise” until after the
bankruptcy proceeding has begun.246 The Ninth Circuit determined that
§ 502(i) addressed a class of claims distinct from those covered by the
postpetition claim-filing provision in § 1305(a).247 According to the Ninth
Circuit, § 502(i) refers to tax claims that, while wholly incurred prepetition,
are not due until after filing the chapter 13 petition.248 Section 1305(a), by
contrast, deals with filing a proof of claim for taxes “incurred after the
filing of the chapter 13 case.”249
Considering both statutory construction and legislative history, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that Code § 1305(a)(1) referred only to taxes the debtor
incurred while the bankruptcy case was pending.250 Disagreeing with the
meaning of “become payable” advanced by the Fifth Circuit, the court in
Joye held that the taxes at issue became payable once the taxable year for
the contested taxes had ended.251 Because the taxes became payable on
January 1, 2001 before the Joyes filed for bankruptcy (on March 7, 2001),
the court concluded that the tax liability was a dischargeable prepetition
claim.252 Thus, the Tax Board’s failure to submit a timely proof of claim
was fatal to its intended recovery.
The Ninth Circuit properly considered the relevance and implications of
both § 502(i) and § 1305(a). A further distinction between the two
provisions is the different terms applied by the statutes. Section 502(i)
describes a tax claim that “does not arise until after the commencement of
the case,” while § 1305(a)(1) describes tax claims that “become payable to
a governmental unit while the case is pending.”253 Furthermore, § 1305
uses the phrase “postpetition claims,” a term absent in § 502(i).254
Moreover, at least one commentator has noted that postpetition liabilities
may only be addressed by the bankruptcy proceeding in accordance with
§ 1305(a).255 Even a look at § 1305(b) seems to support the Ninth Circuit’s
245. Id. at 1076. The Fifth Circuit in Ripley never addressed this provision in the Code.
See supra note 94 and accompanying text for the text of the statute and commentary.
246. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(i) (2006). Section 502(i) applies only to those tax claims that
would have been entitled to priority under Code § 507(a)(8), such as the income tax claims
pertaining to this Note.
247. In re Joye, 578 F.3d at 1076.
248. Id. at 1076 (citing 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 37, ¶ 1300.71[10]).
249. Id. (citing Dixon v. IRS (In re Dixon), 218 B.R. 150, 153 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1998));
see also S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 140 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5926.
250. In re Joye, 578 F.3d at 1076.
251. Id. at 1077 (“Thus, the Joyes could have technically determined and paid their year
2000 taxes on the day after the close of the corresponding calendar year. Although . . . not
required to pay these taxes until [the tax return was due], their tax liability to the state for the
year 2000 was nonetheless capable of being paid, and thus payable, as of January 1, 2001.”).
252. Id.
253. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 502(i) (2006) (emphasis added), with id. § 1305(a)(1)
(emphasis added).
254. Compare id. § 1305, with id. § 502(i).
255. See 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 37, ¶ 1300.71[10].
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holding; that subsection allows or disallows claims “the same as if such
claim had arisen before the date of the filing of the petition.”256 That
language seems to preclude applying § 1305 to those tax claims that were
incurred before the chapter 13 petition was filed, including an income tax
claim based entirely on income earned prepetition, even if the debtor filed a
chapter 13 petition before the tax return for that claim was due.257
The Ninth Circuit concluded that, within the meaning of the Code,
“become payable” is any time “before the last permissible day for paying
taxes.”258 This understanding reinforces the Code’s efforts to address
debtors’ obligations earlier in the proceedings, rather than later.259
Likewise, the plain language of the statute could legitimately equate tax
claims that “become payable” to be those that are “capable of being
paid.”260 As a result, the Ninth Circuit decided that only those tax claims
that had been incurred after the petition date could rightly qualify as a
postpetition claim under § 1305(a).261
From a practical standpoint, the court decided that taxes “become
payable” (are capable of being paid) after the end of the taxable year.262
Taxpayers may calculate and pay their taxes anytime after December 31
even though no payment is required until April 15 of the following year.263
Because the taxes at issue—the Joyes’ tax liability from 2000—were
“payable” before they filed for bankruptcy in March 2001, the court held
that the scheduled tax claim was a prepetition claim discharged by the Tax
Board’s failure to submit a timely proof of claim and by the Joyes’ faithful
completion of their bankruptcy plan.264
As Part II illustrates, the courts in Ripley and Joye understand the phrase
While acknowledging this
“become payable” very differently.265
difference, the courts’ holdings may hinge on more than their
interpretations of this phrase. Although the circuit courts dissected the
meaning of “become payable,” ultimately promulgating two distinct rules,
those analyses actually occurred in different factual circumstances. Part III
expands on this observation and considers whether this factual distinction,
first acknowledged by the Dixon panel yet ignored by the court in Joye, is

256. 11 U.S.C. § 1305(b).
257. Dixon v. IRS (In re Dixon), 218 B.R. 150, 152–53 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1998).
258. Joye v. Franchise Tax Bd. (In re Joye), 578 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting
In re Dixon, 218 B.R. at 152).
259. Id. (citing In re Dixon, 218 B.R. at 152).
260. Id. at 1076 (quoting United States v. Ripley (In re Ripley), 926 F.2d 440, 444 (5th
Cir. 1991)).
261. Id.
262. Id. at 1079.
263. Naturally, should the debtor-taxpayer benefit from additional extensions, payment
could be timely even after the April 15 date.
264. In re Joye, 578 F.3d at 1079, 1081. The court also examined the constitutional
adequacy of the notice provided to the Tax Board before deciding that scheduling creditors
in a bankruptcy proceeding constituted proper notice, in spite of the burden it placed on the
governmental agency. Id. at 1079–81.
265. See supra Part II.
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significant.266 Indeed, both the particular tax claim at issue and the
petition-filing timeline may be more consequential than initially expected.
Part III contemplates the applicability and impact of the tax-return and
taxable-year rules given what are essentially two factually distinct
scenarios.
III. A FACT-SENSITIVE APPROACH TO ANALYZING INCOME TAX CLAIMS IN
CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCIES
Ripley, with its tax-return rule, and Joye, defending a taxable-year rule,
illustrate more than conflicting methodologies: they exemplify the need to
acknowledge and apply the small factual discrepancies on which a chapter
13 case can turn. The facts before both of these courts involved all of the
following: (1) chapter 13 debtors who had completed their debt repayment
plans, (2) taxing authorities whose claims would have been entitled to
priority but for the fact that their proofs of claim were unfiled or filed late,
(3) an income tax claim that was therefore subject to discharge if indeed it
had been incurred prepetition, and (4) litigation regarding the status of that
claim.267
Despite the parallels, where differences have emerged, the variations are
significant. The Fifth Circuit ruled on income tax claims in the petitionyear; the Ninth Circuit’s holding dealt with income tax claims for the prepetition year, when the taxpayer-debtor filed the chapter 13 petition before
the tax return was due. As mentioned earlier, and worth repeating given
their significant role in the upcoming discussion, these claims are not
268
A petition-year tax claim—like that in Ripley—reflects tax
analogous.
liability in the year the bankruptcy petition was filed; a pre-petition-year tax
claim—such as the claim in Joye—represents tax liability in the year
immediately preceding the petition-year.269 This pivotal difference—the
type of claim at issue before the courts—supports this Note’s assertion in
Part III that the rules advanced by the Fifth and Ninth Circuits should not be
characterized as a circuit split.
To underscore this distinction, Part III.A introduces two hypotheticals:
the “Ripley scenario” describes contested taxes in the petition-year, and the
“Joye scenario” describes contested taxes for the pre-petition year.270 Each
hypothetical considers both the Fifth Circuit’s tax-return rule and the Ninth
Circuit’s taxable-year rule to determine if a functional conflict exists, and if
so, how best to resolve it.271 To perform this analysis, Part III.B–C presents
266. Dixon v. IRS (In re Dixon), 218 B.R. 150, 151 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1998) (“[N]either
[of] these cases . . . involved the sequence of events now before us: the Debtors’ tax year
ended, then the Debtors filed for bankruptcy, and then their return for the tax year became
due. [In the other cases], the debtors filed for bankruptcy either before the end of the tax
year or after the tax return was due.”).
267. See supra Part II.
268. See supra notes 12–13.
269. It should be emphasized that “pre-petition-year,” as the phrase is used throughout
this Note, should not be confused with the broader bankruptcy term, “prepetition.”
270. See infra Part III.A.
271. See infra Part III.B–C.
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and employs a framework for analyzing future conflicts regarding the status
of petition-year and pre-petition-year income tax claims in a chapter 13
bankruptcy proceeding.272 This Note proposes that, when analyzing the
pre-petition-year claims in a “Joye scenario” (but not in a “Ripley scenario”
addressing petition-year tax liability), the petition-filing timeline is an
important limiting constraint, which plays a role in classifying claims as
either prepetition or postpetition.
Despite the possibility of viewing Joye and Ripley as factually distinct, in
the sense that these courts have attributed different meanings to the phrase
“become payable,” the potential conflict at the circuit level begs a
resolution. Ultimately, Part III concludes that, although both rules are
functionally identical when applied to petition-year tax liability, the taxreturn rule promulgated by the Fifth Circuit is overinclusive. For that
reason alone, a taxable-year deadline could be the superior rule. In
addition, however, while an actual conflict in legal approaches exists when
applying the two rules in the “Joye scenario,” the Ninth Circuit’s taxableyear rule best embodies both the statutory intent and the bankruptcy policies
reflected in the Code.
A. The Facts Matter: A Look At Petition-Filing Timelines
One conclusion resulting from these decisions is rather straightforward:
§ 1305 of the Bankruptcy Code can be read in two ways. First, tax claims
may “become payable” when the tax return is due, as similar provisions in
the IRC and the ultimate holding of the Fifth Circuit in Ripley would
suggest.273 Alternatively, tax claims may “become payable” upon the close
of the taxable year, the reading proposed by the Dixon panel and seconded
by the Ninth Circuit in Joye.274 Because the rule applied can change the
type of claim at issue and chapter 13 plans treat prepetition claims and
postpetition claims differently,275 a court’s determination regarding this
issue affects the dischargeability of contested tax liability. Although their
readings of “become payable” may conflict, the holdings of the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits may be reconciled by focusing on the factual differences
underlying each ruling. This distinction is apparent in both the type of
claim at issue and the petition-filing timeline.
When examining income tax liability in the chapter 13 context, parties
can challenge either petition-year tax liability or pre-petition-year tax
liability. Petition-year tax liability represents taxes for the year in which a
debtor filed his chapter 13 petition. A close look at the facts of Ripley
reveals that the tax claim at issue concerned petition-year tax liability. The
Ripleys litigated the dischargeability of taxes on income earned during
272. See infra Part III.B–C.
273. See supra Part II.A.
274. See supra Part II.B.
275. Compare supra Part I.D.2.c (describing discharge provisions as they apply to
prepetition claims), with supra Part I.D.3.c (establishing that postpetition claims are not
dischargeable in the bankruptcy case and describing a creditor’s options when holding a
postpetition claim).
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1987,276 but they filed their bankruptcy petition in November 1987, before
the end of the taxable year.277 With two exceptions,278 other courts whose
conclusions are consistent with Ripley all share this key fact.279 In each
case, as in Ripley, the contested petition-year taxes were held to be a
nondischargeable postpetition claim.280
This Note describes a chapter 13 case that addresses such petition-year
tax liability as a “Ripley scenario.” Consider, as an example, a debtor
named Ron Ripper who files a chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on February
27, 2002. His 2002 income taxes form petition-year tax liability, which
inevitably includes taxes on income earned both before and after filing for
bankruptcy. Though entitled to priority for its claim, the IRS never submits
a proof of claim for the petition-year taxes, and thus Ron’s plan does not
provide for income taxes incurred in 2002. Over the next three to five
years, Ron Ripper completes his chapter 13 repayment plan as intended,
and the court discharges all of his outstanding obligations.
In addition to the petition-year liability addressed in the “Ripley
scenario,” debtors can also contest the status of pre-petition-year tax
liability, taxes owed in the year immediately preceding the filing year.281
Where pre-petition-year taxes are concerned, when the debtor filed his
chapter 13 petition plays a critical role in the analysis. The contrary rules
promulgated by the Fifth and Ninth Circuits effectively create two subsets
of bankruptcy cases in the pre-petition-year context. Under the first subset
of cases, a chapter 13 debtor files his petition after the tax return for the prepetition-year taxes were due, after April 15.282 Since the bankruptcy
petition was filed after the tax return was due, the tax would have been both
276. Although the Ripleys conceded that they incurred the final quarter of taxes after their
petition date, they also sought to declare (and have discharged) the taxes incurred during the
first three quarters of the year. See United States v. Ripley (In re Ripley), 926 F.2d 440, 442
(5th Cir. 1991).
277. See id.
278. In re Turner, 420 B.R. 711, 714–15 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2009) (applying a tax-return
rule to pre-petition-year tax liability out of misplaced concern about impairing the rights of
governmental entities and without acknowledging portions of Rule 3002(c)(1), which would
have ameliorated this concern); In re Jagours, 236 B.R. 616, 618–19 (Bankr. E.D. Tex.
1999) (holding that, although an amended IRS claim that sought to add tax liability for the
petition-year could be a valid postpetition claim, the debtor must first approve inclusion of
the claim before the chapter 13 plan could be modified).
279. See, e.g., Savaria v. United States (In re Savaria), 317 B.R. 395, 397, 402 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 2004) (debtors filed for bankruptcy on December 31, 2002 and claim for 2002 taxes
held to be a postpetition liability); In re Holmes, 312 B.R. 876, 877–78 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
2004) (debtor filed for bankruptcy on October 10, 2002 and claim for 2002 taxes held to be a
postpetition claim); Matravers v. United States (In re Matravers), 149 B.R. 204, 205 (Bankr.
D. Utah 1993) (debtor filed for bankruptcy on December 3, 1984 and claim for 1984 taxes
held to be a postpetition liability); In re Ryan, 78 B.R. 175, 176, 183 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1987) (debtor filed for chapter 13 in September 1981 and claim for 1981 taxes held to be a
postpetition claim); In re Rothman, 76 B.R. 38, 39–40 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987) (debtor filed
for chapter 13 on August 27, 1980 and year 1980 tax debt held to be a postpetition liability).
280. See supra notes 275–76.
281. Although pre-petition-year tax liability could technically represent taxes for any
taxable year ending before the chapter 13 filing date, this Note uses the term to refer only to
tax liability in the year immediately before the petition-year.
282. This April 15 date assumes no extensions apply.
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fully incurred and fully owed before the chapter 13 case commenced.283 It
is a prepetition claim.
By contrast, the second subset of chapter 13 cases encompasses those
debtors who file for bankruptcy after the end of the taxable year but before
the tax return for the pre-petition-year tax claim was due. The Joyes
litigated the dischargeability of tax liability for the year 2000, filing their
chapter 13 petition on March 7, 2001, before their 2000 state tax return was
due.284 Thus, the facts of Joye fall within this second subset of cases
addressing pre-petition-year tax liability.
This Note refers to the second subset of cases dealing with pre-petitionyear tax liability as a “Joye scenario.” For the purposes of this discussion,
it is important to remember that not all pre-petition-year tax liability falls
within a “Joye scenario”; this scenario only contemplates pre-petition-year
income tax claims when the debtor filed his petition between January 1 and
April 14, assuming no extensions apply. To illustrate, consider another
debtor, Jack Joya who (like Ron Ripper) also files for chapter 13 on
February 27, 2002. Note that the February 27 petition-filing date is both
after the end of the 2001 taxable year yet before the 2001 tax return is due.
The IRS files a proof of claim for the 2001 taxes after the bar date for
governmental claims, despite receiving proper notice of the impending case.
After Jack Joya completes his debt repayment plan (which did not provide
for the tardily filed claim) and benefits from the chapter 13 discharge, the
IRS challenges the validity of the discharge as it pertains to the 2001 taxes.
Both the “Ripley scenario” and the “Joye scenario” are merely
hypotheticals, useful examples for understanding how certain types of tax
liability might be contested in a chapter 13 case. These illustrations can
also clarify how courts should approach income tax claims in consumer
reorganizations. Part III.B–C examines the Ripley and Joye scenarios using
a methodical approach absent in prior analyses and frames the courts’
disagreement about when claims “become payable” as one aspect of
analyzing the status of petition-year and pre-petition-year tax claims.
B. “Ripley Scenario”: What Split?
Having presented the “Ripley scenario” and the “Joye scenario,” the first
step when analyzing the status of any income tax liability in a chapter 13
case is to determine under which scenario the tax claim falls. If the
contested claim falls under a “Ripley scenario” and addresses petition-year
tax liability, courts need only to determine when the claim “become[s]
payable” within the meaning of § 1305(a)(1).285 Should the taxes “become
payable” at year’s end or once the tax return is due? If the claim does
“become payable” during the pending chapter 13 case, then it could be filed

283. See supra Part I.D.2.
284. Joye v. Franchise Tax Bd. (In re Joye), 578 F.3d 1070, 1072 (9th Cir. 2009).
285. Unlike with pre-petition-year tax liability, the petition-filing timeline plays no role in
the analysis because chapter 13 filers are not permitted to make a short-year election and
split their taxable year.
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postpetition under Code § 1305; if, however, the claim does not “become
payable” during the pending case, then, by elimination, it must be a
prepetition claim.
Regardless of whether the courts apply a tax-return or taxable-year rule,
they should arrive at the same conclusion: the tax claim is best classified as
a postpetition claim. This is true under either understanding of when claims
“become payable.” Moreover, at least among courts that have adjudicated
petition-year tax liability, a consensus has emerged that this type of claim
becomes payable postpetition.286 Finally, although the Ninth Circuit has
not examined a case on these facts,287 it too would probably decide that the
debt became payable postpetition. Applying the taxable-year rule in a
“Ripley scenario,” the tax liability for 2001 still is not “capable of being
paid” on February 27 of that same year.288 The claim would not “become
payable” within the meaning of § 1305 until after the bankruptcy petition
had been filed, on January 1, 2002. In short, the status properly accorded to
tax claims for the petition-year is always that of postpetition debt and
should be governed by the postpetition filing provision in Code § 1305.
Although the Fifth Circuit’s decision arrived at a similar conclusion, its
holding—that the tax return due date is dispositive to the analysis—should
be subject to greater scrutiny. Indeed, while another court suggested that a
taxable-year cutoff could be an appropriate alternative, it ultimately
concluded (without discussion) that the tax-return rule was “more likely”
preferable.289
Because it accomplishes no more and no less than a taxable-year cutoff,
the tax-return rule is superfluous and therefore inferior. After December
31, a debtor who files a chapter 13 petition is no longer in a “Ripley
scenario,” which only contemplates petition-year tax liability. A taxable
year has ended and to litigate tax liability for that same year, the claim no
longer represents petition-year tax liability but tax liability in the year
before filing for chapter 13, a pre-petition-year tax claim. If the debtor filed
for chapter 13 between January 1 and April 14 of the subsequent taxable
year, he falls squarely in a “Joye scenario”;290 on or beyond April 15, any
taxes owed were both incurred and payable prepetition, a quintessential
prepetition claim.291
The tax-return rule captures no additional claims that a taxable-year rule
cannot. To the extent that it is functionally equivalent to a rule that finds

286. See supra note 279.
287. The court in Joye ruled on pre-petition-year tax liability.
288. See supra note 260 and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit’s application of the
taxable-year rule extends beyond the chapter 13 context. Cf. Towers v. United States (In re
Pac.-Atl. Trading Co.), 64 F.3d 1292 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying the same rule in a corporate
chapter 7 case).
289. In re Holmes, 312 B.R. 876, 878 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2004).
290. This range of dates assumes no automatic extensions are applicable and the debtor
has not availed himself of outside extensions.
291. See supra Part I.D.2.
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claims “become payable” once the taxable year ends, it is gratuitous.292
Thus, a taxable-year cutoff for when claims “become payable” is most
appropriate.
Effectively, all petition-year tax liability constitutes postpetition debt that
cannot be discharged by the bankruptcy court unless it was provided for in
the chapter 13 repayment plan.293 The Code only allows taxing authorities
to file proofs of postpetition income tax claims,294 so tax agencies are not
forced to monitor taxpayers’ pending bankruptcy court deadlines under a
looming threat of discharge. This highlights a point where the policies of
the Bankruptcy Code collide295: that outcome favors both the tax agency
and the public at the expense of chapter 13 filers.
Moreover, nondischargeability of a debtor’s postpetition income tax debt
also preserves the collective societal benefit of tax collection and
government spending.296 Assuming the tax agency acts to compel
repayment of a tax claim, contested taxes would be repaid in one of two
ways: as part of the bankruptcy plan (if the agency filed a proof of claim
under § 1305(a)) or in a direct action against the debtor.297
Though it benefits both taxing authorities and the public, the unilateral
ruling that an income tax claim becomes payable postpetition carries
negative ramifications for the debtor. If the contested tax liability was
indeed a postpetition claim, even a debtor’s proactive efforts to include and
pay off those taxes through his bankruptcy plan are futile.298 Moreover,
even upon completing the plan, the petition-year tax claim is
nondischargeable.299 This ruling deprives the debtor of a chance to pay this
claim over time via the bankruptcy case, interfering with the Code’s intent
to deal with all of the debtor’s legal obligations, “no matter how remote or
contingent.”300
Additionally, an inherent inequity in this determination makes a “Ripley
scenario” problematic. Petition-year tax liability derives only in part from
taxes incurred after filing for bankruptcy. Because chapter 13 filers may
not make a short-year election,301 postpetition income tax claims inevitably
capture taxes representing at least one day of prepetition income. Indeed, in
292. A precedent for applying a taxable-year cutoff to determine when a tax claim was
“incurred by the estate” within the meaning of Code § 503(b)(1)(B)(i) exists for the purpose
of identifying administrative expenses in a bankruptcy case. That case, however, lies beyond
the scope of Code § 1305 because it dealt with a corporate chapter 7 liquidation. See In re
Pac.-Atl. Trading Co., 64 F.3d at 1300 (holding taxes are always incurred on the last day of
the taxable year).
293. See supra note 167.
294. See supra notes 160–62 and accompanying text.
295. See supra Part I.B for a description of bankruptcy policies.
296. See supra note 64.
297. See supra notes 166–67 and accompanying text.
298. Only the creditor may submit proof of postpetition claim. See supra notes 160–61
and accompanying text.
299. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
300. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 309 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6266;
see also supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 69–78 and accompanying text.
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extreme cases, up to 364 days of tax liability could be incurred before the
debtor filed a chapter 13 petition.302 That result departs from a goal
adopted by the earliest incarnations of bankruptcy legislation: providing
debtors with a fresh financial start.303
Though the Code’s accommodations for a governmental taxing
authority304 are reasonable, they disadvantage debtors. But that is the hand
dealt to courts that must adjudicate conflicts given a Code whose twin
purposes are inherently in conflict.305 Although applying this form of
analysis to petition-year income tax claims favors creditors, the inequity to
debtors may be tempered by how courts address pre-petition-year tax
liability in a “Joye scenario.”
C. “Joye Scenario”: In a Presumptive Circuit Split the Taxable Year Rules
If a tax claim is a pre-petition-year tax liability as described in a “Joye
scenario,” courts should perform a two-step analysis that considers both the
petition-filing timeline and when contested claims become payable.306
First, courts should use the petition-filing timeline to distinguish between
chapter 13 petitions filed on or after the tax return due date and those
chapter 13 petitions filed before the tax return due date for the contested
claim. The former are clearly prepetition claims incurred and due prior to
filing for bankruptcy.
Next, the latter claims should be examined to see when they “bec[a]me
payable.” When performing this analysis in a “Joye scenario,” the taxableyear and the tax-return rules yield different outcomes, resulting in a
presumptive circuit split.307 Applying the taxable-year rule leads to the
conclusion that the tax claim was payable on January 1, 2002, before the
chapter 13 petition was filed. That would make this particular debt a
prepetition claim. Consequently, once Jack Joya completes the chapter 13
plan, the court would likely discharge the debt since prepetition tax
liabilities in chapter 13 can be discharged for a creditor’s failure to file a
proof of claim.308
By contrast, when extending the tax-return rule to a “Joye scenario,” the
critical “become payable” date for calendar filers would generally be April
15. In a “Joye scenario,” even though the entire tax liability was derived
from income earned prepetition, it had not yet “become payable,” and a
court would see it as a postpetition claim. Because the tax return due date

302. See In re Holmes, 312 B.R. 876, 878 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2004).
303. See supra note 54, 60, and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.
305. See supra Part I.B and accompanying text.
306. Recall that a pre-petition-year tax claim only falls within a “Joye scenario” if the
debtor files the chapter 13 petition between the end of the taxable year and before the
relevant tax return is due.
307. The circuit split is only presumptive because the Fifth Circuit has not yet been faced
with this particular fact pattern.
308. See supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text.
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on which claims “become payable” has yet to pass, this would be seen as a
nondischargeable postpetition debt.309
The legislative history behind § 1305 portrays subsection (a)(1) as a
vehicle for introducing claims that both “become payable” and are incurred
after filing for chapter 13.310 That, however, seems to undercut the logic
behind applying a tax-return rule in a “Joye scenario” to a pre-petition-year
tax claim incurred entirely prior to the petition-filing date.
Moreover, Ripley arguments that advance an IRC-informed
understanding of the Bankruptcy Code seem less persuasive outside the
context of claims in the petition-year. For example, the assertion that the
IRC reflects the “annual nature” of income taxes311 could aptly describe
fully-incurred pre-petition-year claims, regardless of whether the taxableyear or the tax-return rule applied. Likewise, any argument that taxes are
merely an estimate and subject to change312 may be germane when
discussing petition-year income taxes, but is far less so once the taxable
year ends. Finally, although deductions may be made until the tax return is
due,313 once the taxpayer submits that return, the taxing authority still may
submit a proof of claim within sixty days to challenge or contest the amount
declared.314 Thus, even if this tax liability is treated as a prepetition claim,
a taxing authority can file a timely response to the debtor’s tax return
ensuring an accurate collection.315
In cases that fall within a “Joye scenario,” the crucial distinction is that
all of the tax liability relates to income earned prepetition.316 From a
logical standpoint, § 1305, whose title informs that it applies to the “[f]iling
and allowance of postpetition claims,” should have no bearing on a tax
claim that was incurred as a result of services rendered wholly during the
prepetition period.317 The counterargument—the tax, though incurred
before the chapter 13 petition was filed was not payable until postpetition—
has been rejected by at least one commentator.318 If § 1305(a) were

309. See supra notes 165–67 and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
311. United States v. Ripley (In re Ripley), 926 F.2d 440, 444 (5th Cir. 1991).
312. See supra notes 207–10 and accompanying text.
313. Joye v. Franchise Tax Bd. (In re Joye), 578 F.3d 1070, 1083 (9th Cir. 2009)
(Graber, J., dissenting).
314. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. Sixty days represents a minimum. If
the time remaining from the initial 180-day governmental filing deadline exceeds sixty days,
the longer timeline applies. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002(c).
315. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002(c).
316. Compare this to the “Ripley scenario” described in Part III.A, where the petition-year
tax liability was derived from income earned both prepetition and postpetition.
317. 11 U.S.C. § 1305 (2006); see also INS v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, 502 U.S.
183, 189 (1991) (noting that a statute’s title “can aid in resolving an ambiguity in the
legislation’s text”).
318. See Craig A. Gargotta, Post-Petition Tax Compliance Under the Bankruptcy Code:
Can the IRS Enforce Tax Collection After Bankruptcy Is Filed?, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 113 (2003) (discussing post-petition tax compliance).
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intended to function in this way, § 502(i) would be made superfluous.319
The more logical conclusion is to read § 1305(a) as governing only those
claims that “become payable” while the bankruptcy is pending, leaving
§ 502(i) to address priority-eligible tax claims that do “not arise until after
the commencement of the case.”320 Such a construction would also explain
why the Ripley court never considered 502(i) in its discussion; the petitionyear tax claim at issue there was not of a type that was fully incurred prior
to the date the chapter 13 petition was filed.
Common rules of statutory construction also support the distinct
meanings attributed to § 1305 and § 502(i). When two statutes appear to
conflict, courts “must read . . . statutes to give effect to each if [they] can do
so while preserving their sense and purpose.”321 In applying this principle,
when the allegedly conflicting laws were passed in the same session of
Congress, as were Code § 502(i) and § 1305, this presumption is even
stronger.322 From a statutory perspective, the taxable-year rule more
cohesively interacts with the Code’s scattered provisions than the tax-return
rule.
From a policy standpoint too, the taxable-year rule has advantages,
though when compared to the policy arguments about petition-year tax
liability, the incentives are now reversed. First, using this rule embraces the
classic bankruptcy goal of providing debtors with a fresh start.323
Especially in the context of the rigorous, prolonged chapter 13 case, the
Code contemplates an inclusive superdischarge provision that rewards the
debtor who elects to repay his debts over time.324 A tax-return rule
excludes pre-petition-year tax claims in a “Joye scenario” from this
discharge, a ruling that seems to clash with the Code’s broad chapter 13
discharge.
Second, by applying the debtor-favoring rule when the claim constitutes
pre-petition-year tax liability, the taxable-year rule mollifies the
disadvantage debtors experience when the challenged tax claim denotes
petition-year tax liability. Unlike in a petition-year income tax (and
therefore postpetition) claim scenario, the onus is on the taxing authority to
act: if it sees something it dislikes, it must object to the claim325 or file a
proof of claim after the debtor submits his tax return.326 These remedies
allow taxing authorities to engage the bankruptcy court and protect the
public’s interests on a more flexible timeline.
319. Section 502(i) addresses tax claims that merit eighth priority according to Code
§ 507(a)(8) but that “[do] not arise” until after the bankruptcy case begins. See supra note 94
and accompanying text.
320. 11 U.S.C. § 502(i); see also supra notes 94, 245–48 and accompanying text.
321. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981); YULE KIM, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS,
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 26 (2008),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf.
322. Pullen v. Morgenthau, 73 F.2d 281, 283 (2d Cir. 1934); KIM, supra note 321, at 27.
323. See supra notes 54, 60–63 and accompanying text.
324. See supra note 49 and text accompanying note 128.
325. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text.
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Finally, despite what might be viewed as added responsibility, in fact,
when the creditor is a taxing authority, applying a taxable-year rule leaves it
not much worse off. A primary concern about tax agencies is the sheer
number of taxpayers in bankruptcy and the tax agency’s role as an
involuntary creditor in the bankruptcy case.327 Adherents may try to justify
the tax-return rule by arguing that an available tax return would facilitate
action by the taxing authority. But Congress wrote into the Code flexible
filing provisions that favor governmental agencies.328 At worst, a taxing
authority’s deadline to act is already keyed to when the debtor submits the
return for the pre-petition-year tax; at best, the governmental agency can
delay filing a proof of claim for as long as it can “show cause.”329
Asserting that “the taxing authority’s rights may be routinely impaired
through no fault of its own” is starkly misleading about the supposed
breadth of injury apparent in a taxable-year rule.330 Thus, although tax
authorities still benefit from certain Code provisions, the greater emphasis
appears to be on the debtor’s fresh start.331 Applying the taxable year rule
to pre-petition-year tax liability in a “Joye scenario” reinforces that choice.
CONCLUSION
Courts adjudicating the dischargeability of income tax claims in a chapter
13 case should be mindful that the analysis is highly fact-specific. The
circuits do disagree about the exact meaning of the phrase “become
payable” within the meaning of Code § 1305. But, the Fifth Circuit’s taxreturn rule addressed only petition-year tax liability, while a pre-petitionyear tax claim was at the heart of the Ninth Circuit’s taxable-year rule. For
that reason, the decisions should be characterized as rulings addressing two
distinct sets of facts, rather than as a true circuit split. Consequently, the
courts’ respective holdings must be reapplied with care.
The method for determining the status of income tax claims in chapter 13
varies depending on whether it constitutes a claim for petition-year or prepetition-year taxes. If the former, courts need only determine when claims
“become payable” within the meaning of Code § 1305(a). If, however, the
claims represent pre-petition-year taxes, courts should look first to the
petition-filing timeline before analyzing the moment at which claims
“become payable.”
Should the courts’ presumptive split become a legal actuality, the
taxable-year rule, advocated by the Ninth Circuit, best embraces when taxes
“become payable.” In a “Ripley scenario” dealing with petition-year tax
liability, the taxable-year rule is functionally equivalent to the tax-return
rule, but superior because it is not unnecessarily broad. In a “Joye
327. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text.
329. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002(c)(1).
330. In re Turner, 420 B.R. 711, 715 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2009); see also In re
Senczyszyn, 426 B.R. 250, 254 n.1 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2010) (dismissing the notion that
taxing authorities are prejudiced when taxes “become payable” at the end of a taxable year).
331. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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scenario,” which deals with pre-petition-year taxes and a debtor who files
for bankruptcy between January 1 and April 14, the two rules lead to
divergent results. Here too, however, the taxable-year rule is preferable
because it corresponds with the statutory construction of other Code
provisions and bankruptcy policies favoring a debtor’s fresh financial start.

